

# THE MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*.

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke*.

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## SIGNS OF THE TIMES

### THE BISHOPS' POLICY.

One's heart bleeds for the bishops. Somehow, they have got to restore order. They have always maintained that discipline could not be maintained on the basis of the 1662 Book, yet their proposals of 1927 and 1928 have been rejected by Parliament. No doubt, the obvious policy would be to cut the painter and to seek disestablishment, as the Bishop of Durham suggests. But the bishops wisely, as we think, decline to do this, at least at present. They know perfectly well that heroic policies are very rarely wise.

On the other hand, they know that to 'take it lying down' would expose them to a storm of obloquy from the innumerable host of devout persons whose opinions they are bound to consider. The *Church Times*, even, which loathed their Prayer Book, would at once call out Israel to its tents if such a surrender were proposed. Thus to defy and to obey Parliament are alike impossible. Some way out had to be found of being disobedient without being defiant. The task was difficult, but strategy has never been a weak point with churchmen, and the bishops have made a brave try. They have devised an interim policy to serve during the anomalous situation in the relations between Church and State which has come about.

One of the ablest and most liberal of their apologists, Canon Raven, in an article in *The Church of England Newspaper* for July 26th, describes their policy as follows :

‘What they have actually done has been, broadly speaking, to accept the decision of Parliament; to remind us that discipline must be maintained; and, without sanctioning the Revised Book, to ask Convocation to assent to the administration of discipline along the lines reached after years of debate, approved by the Assembly, and expressed in the Book of 1928.’

It should be remembered that to avoid the appearance of a clash with Parliament is an essential part of the Bishops’ policy, though at the same time they dare not let it be thought in the Church camp that they are making a surrender. They had to find what nowadays is called a ‘formula’ (the term has become familiar in diplomatic and industrial negotiations) whereby you may get what you want without appearing to do so, or surrender something while appearing to retain it. In this case, the formula has worked out more or less as follows: ‘We recognise that you have rejected our Book; we will therefore not sanction its use, but only regard it as a basis for the administration of discipline.’

This formula gives the bishops all they want, which is a basis for discipline. But, on the other hand, they do not really get what they want, partly because their disciplinary enactments have not the force of law, partly (and this is, on the whole, more serious) because they have not the moral force of conviction behind them. Everyone knows that their policy is a mere expedient; indeed, the bishops have admitted as much themselves.

Let us look at the matter from the point of view of a conscientious and convinced member of the F.C.P., who holds doctrines of the Mass identical with those held in the Roman Church. (Father Woodlock, in his *The Reformation and the Eucharist*, p. 42, has set the *Imprimatur* to Dr. Darwell Stone’s doctrine of the Eucharist, which, however, he declares to be not Anglican, but Roman.)

Such a man is bound to ask why it is the regulations of 1928 which are to stand, rather than those of 1927, which pressed less hardly upon Catholics. The stricter Reservation rubrics of the later book were only a concession to Protestant prejudice, and

did not proceed from the bishops' own convictions, besides having considerably less support from the main body of Church opinion.

The bishops have never told such a man that his views are untenable, and yet they forbid, and seek to suppress, liturgical practices which are the natural and traditional consequences of those beliefs. Such a man will feel that the bishops are trying to force him into a position which is morally untenable. 'You may retain your beliefs, but you must not practise them' is what his Fathers in God seem to him to be saying. He feels that this is to treat with levity what to him are fundamental convictions. It would be more honest to tell him that his convictions are mistaken, or at least not consistent with the sacramental teaching of the Church of England. He would then know where he stood, and could at least get on or get out.

And here, of course, lies the real weakness and (we fear we must add) the fundamental dishonesty of the bishops' attitude. They seek to evade the real issue, which is *doctrinal*. They simply dare not face it. But all the time it is there, and it is the rock on which their policy is bound to split.

#### THE CONVOCATION OUTBURST.

It is not unnatural, perhaps, that the Bishop of Birmingham should have earned a certain measure of unpopularity amongst some of his colleagues. Dr. Furse's attack and the Archbishop's rebuke are evidence of this. The reason is that Dr. Barnes has questioned their policy from the beginning. He, like the other bishops, realised the difficulty of the situation created by those who for years past have been assimilating Anglican sacramental beliefs to those of the Roman church; but he, unlike the others, saw that the only rational method of procedure was to raise the issue whether these beliefs were or were not true. As he put it in the preface of a book published after the brawl in St. Paul's :

'It is quite certain that we cannot get in the Church either harmony or unity based on a common spiritual understanding, while opposing sacramental beliefs are, as at present, struggling for mastery. . . . In the interests of law and order within the Church of England, it is the duty of its bishops to define its sacramental position. . . . They might then be able not only to bring peace to the Church, but also to persuade many now outside it that our sacraments are truly the means of God's revelation of Himself.'

Dr. Barnes has never failed in his own diocese to support his disciplinary action by open condemnation of the doctrines upon which forbidden practices were based. It has been urged against him that he has done this in an offensive manner. Dr. Lang, for example, in the public and uncalled-for rebuke administered during the session of the Upper House of Canterbury Convocation on July 11th (for which he has received the thanks of the E.C.U.) said :

‘The bishop can scarcely realise that every day I receive from every part of the Church, both in this country and across the seas, and from representatives of every section of the Church, indignant protests against the kind of language with which the Bishop of Birmingham—I think it must be inadvertently—wounds the consciences and feelings of so many of his brother churchmen.’

The Bishop of St. Alban’s, too, in his regrettable outburst, alluded to ‘the language which is hurting the feelings and religious susceptibilities of thousands of people in this country and throughout the world.’ Thus we are compelled to realise the existence of a certain resentment amongst a large number of well-meaning people, not only with regard to what is said by Dr. Barnes, but also with regard to the way in which he says it.

What is complained of cannot be personal attacks, for from all such attacks Dr. Barnes has consistently refrained, in spite of the most ample provocation on the part of his far less scrupulous adversaries. To our minds, his line of attack has been ‘offensive’ because it has been *new*. It must be remembered that Dr. Barnes, unlike most of his colleagues, felt it to be a cowardly evasion of the real issue, besides being futile, to condemn liturgical practices without condemning the doctrines from which they naturally proceed. And, in attacking these doctrines (as he was in duty bound to do), he followed *the only line of argument that could hope to be effective*. To have taken the usual line of an appeal to Cranmer or Hooker, or the Articles, would have been merely to court derision amongst men who repudiate those authorities in favour of mediaeval or post-Tridentine teaching. Nor would the appeal to Scripture have been any more effective, partly because his opponents do not recognise a scientific exegesis of Scripture, and partly because that appeal can always be countered by an appeal to Tradition, a vague and therefore serviceable formula. In the

ands of historians, the appeal to tradition has solidity and meaning, but these men are not historians. Their Church history is not history at all, but a medley of ecclesiastical fables.

Dr. Barnes is himself a physicist and mathematician (the only F.R.S. on the bench), and it was natural that he should approach the problem from the point of view of *present experience*, both physical and psychological. This was the line taken in the now famous dinner-hour sermon preached in Birmingham Parish Church on October 6, 1927—the sermon which was the cause of the St. Paul's brawl, which of course, by undermining public confidence in the bishops, wrecked their Book. The passage has been often quoted, but we will quote it again :

‘There are among ourselves to-day men and women whose sacramental beliefs are not far from those of the cultured Hindu idolater. They pretend that a priest, using the right words and acts, can change a piece of bread so that within it is the real presence of Christ. The idea is absurd, and can be disproved by experiment. If there is a *physical* change in the bread, chemical analysis would enable us to detect it. All are agreed that this type of change does not take place. Yet, if there be a *spiritual* change, it must surely be possible for man to recognize it by his spiritual perception. Now I assert—and who will gainsay me?—that there is no man living who, if a piece of bread were presented to him, could say whether or not it had been consecrated.’

The whole *rationale* of this method of attack may be found in an utterance of Dr. Barnes delivered as long ago as 1925 in a paper read to a Modern Churchmen's Conference at Oxford : ‘For the belief that inanimate matter can be endowed with spiritual qualities there is no scientific evidence.’ Both the truth and relevance of this statement are incontestable. The word ‘spiritual’ no doubt is surrounded with a mist of ambiguity. But not as Dr. Barnes uses it. The conception he is attacking is that which assimilates ‘spiritual’ to that primitive view of *mana*, or of supernaturalistic quality, which is believed to inhere in material objects and renders them at once dangerous and worshipful. This is rightly branded as superstition. That a material object can be a symbol, and thereby be invested with meaning’ and therefore with spirit, no one denies. But the altar, when consecrated, is more than a symbol, more even than a centre of religious experience, to those who hold the views that Dr. Barnes criticizes.

**DR. BARNES' POLICY.**

Shortly after the decisions of Convocation, and in answer to the attack made upon him, the Bishop of Birmingham issued a statement to the Press. Here he repeats his

'conviction that we cannot get any unity worth having within the Church of England unless such unity is based upon sound doctrine. In particular, it is of primary importance that the Church should determine whether its sacramental doctrine is to be that of the Reformers or that of the Roman Church. While this decision is in the balance, controversy will be acute.'

Nor will it be possible, in the course of such controversy, to avoid giving offence. 'If our teaching is clear and decisive those whose views it condemns will be hurt.' The issue is one of vital importance to religion, since the choice is between 'the religion of the Spirit which draws man directly to God and that of a mechanical sacramentalism working upon the supposition that spiritual properties can be made to inhere in material objects.' The Bishop appeals, however, to combatants on his side 'completely to avoid all personal attacks,' and points out that 'he who does not suffer in the service of truth is unlikely to give effective service to truth.' Some who pleaded for peace during the War learned this; and the warning is timely. One cannot speak the truth and at the same time expect to be popular. Yet the quarrel is worth fighting in, for 'we are fully assured that our teaching must prevail if the Church of England is to become once again the Church of the English people.'

'We can preach religion inspired and controlled by Christ, yet shaped by the new knowledge and understanding of our own era. Modernists must find in the wide-ranging humanity of Jesus, His freedom from ecclesiasticism, His direct dependence upon God and his desire to help others the keynote of social and political progress. So I urge that we must unite wherever possible with Christians of other denominations. As a part of our religion we must plead for international peace. We must demand better housing, lest squalor and moral disease continue to deprive many of spiritual understanding and hope. We must be ready to accept more taxation if any successful measures can be taken against unemployment. When I feel hurt by something said of me I think of the misery of the man who cannot get work, and then I am ashamed of my pettiness. Finally, I would say that we must be enthusiasts for education just because we believe it is valueless to get a man, in Tyrrell's phrase, to lean on the priest and the sacraments. We would have men thankfully use the sacrament of Holy Communion and prove that all Christ's followers are His priests.'

### ARCHBISHOPS' PASTORAL.

In considerable contrast to the above is the 'Pastoral Letter to the Church of England' circulated for public reading in church on the last Sunday in July. The difference between the two pastorals, the Bishop of Birmingham's manifesto and that of the two metropolitans, is that the one is designed to say something quite definite, whereas it is the necessary purpose of the other to avoid any such thing.

As a consequence, we may congratulate our leaders rather upon what they do not, than upon what they do, say. The anxious reader will find with relief that there is nothing here, for example, to provoke a quarrel with Parliament, which indeed neither party desires. Meanwhile the clergy are urged to rub shoulders together, and to try to understand one another's point of view; and the laity are besought to leave their harrassed clergy free to think and read and pray — all of which is very good advice.

We note that our Archbishops realise that among our own people, and especially among the young, 'there are many who are haunted by the fear that new knowledge is shaking the foundations of their Faith.' Of course outside that area of what may rightly be called 'our own people,' the situation now is that they do not worry any longer. The Faith is either gone entirely or has never existed. This is what we are up against; and this is why we think that the attempt made by Dr. Barnes straightforwardly to think out afresh the basis of Christian faith is the most useful service that a man can do for his Church at the present time. But what does he get in return? Abuse from the great body of ignorant Churchpeople, both clergy and laity; and, as if that were not enough, public rebukes from men who ought to be ashamed to be found on the side of the *canaille*.

### GETTING THE WIND UP.

The August issue of *Theology* contains an Editorial article which will probably attract some attention. It is a clarion call to arms against the Modernist menace, though the shrillness of hysteria to some extent weakens its effect. It leads off in good style:

'It may be doubted whether the outlook for the Church of England was ever more dark, or its condition more insupportable to all true

believers in the Christian faith, than it is to-day. A century ago Keble and his friends were confronted with a relatively clear issue; the nation had apostatized from Christianity through its alliance with the new liberalism, and the Church must awake to the reality of its vocation, and emphasise its distinctness from the world. To-day the spirit of apostasy is going to work by far subtler methods. It is not the nation but the Church itself which is to be false to the Gospel of Christ. Not by open attack, but by flattery; not by burning down Bishops' palaces, but by filling them with men who can be trusted to deny the faith they promised to defend; not by threats of disestablishment, but by the firmer establishment of heresy in the high offices of the Church—it is thus that to-day the citadel of English religion is being undermined.'

We should not wish to spoil the effect of this admirable exordium by reminding our readers that the national apostasy denounced by Keble was the reasonable determination of the Reform Parliament to set the Church's house in order; but we gladly concede that terror of liberalism in every shape was the origin of the Oxford Movement.

But the immediate occasion of the article seems to have been the sermons recently delivered by the Bishop of Birmingham, and by Archdeacon Charles, of which most of our readers will have seen accounts in the press. Since the comments on these sermons, offered by this article, can hardly be taken seriously (we are asked to believe that the Bishop's sermon 'was designed to discredit . . . the whole historical basis of Christianity'), we pass them over, out of charity, in silence.

We fear, however, that both the purpose and the effect of sermons of this kind is misunderstood by the Editor of *Theology*. If they are not designed to destroy Christianity, neither are they to be regarded as 'part and parcel of the rôle of Court Chaplains to King Demos' (we are glad that the Editor of *Theology* should borrow a phrase from the Dean of St. Paul's). Nor do we believe that 'there is nothing which so much pleases the secularist and the pleasure-lover as utterances like those of Dr. Barnes and Dr. Charles.' On the contrary, secularists attack Modernists on the ground that they are helping to keep alive an institution which ought to be suffered to die; and as for pleasure-lovers, they do not interest themselves at all in theological disputes. They care no more for Dr. Barnes than for Lord Halifax: what theology their jazzy brains can absorb they get from Hollywood.

Nor do we believe that the general educated public is scandalized by such utterances as the sermons referred to. 'The repeated attacks of Modernists on the faith' is really a piece of rhetorical clap-trap; and the general opinion about 'clerical veracity' is raised, not lowered. People are, indeed, astounded to hear ecclesiastical dignitaries calling things by their names, and telling the truth as they see it. There is no possible doubt that the great majority of serious-minded, ethical, and thoughtful Englishmen are behind Dr. Barnes; the general feeling is that if we had half-a-dozen bishops like him, the Church of England would get a chance, since it would not be smothered by pedantic prejudices irrelevant to religion. The trouble is that too many of our Church leaders are so much immersed in the ecclesiastical point of view as to be unaware of what people are thinking. The devout are so vocal, that the bishops can hear nothing but their cries.

This, of course, accounts for the lamentable affair in Convocation to which we have alluded already. It is very regrettable that an Archbishop should have to yield to pressure from clerical bigots, but the article before us indicates that the protest of the Bishop of St. Albans, which had little relevance to the debate, was pre-arranged. Evidently the bishops had been subjected to heavy fire for a long time, and something had to be done to get the barrage lifted.

The article before us, after asking: What can be done? observes:

'We hope that, by the time this number appears, something may have been done in Convocation to make clear to the Bishops and to the world outside what is the view of the clergy. For our own part, we are convinced that the Bishops cannot hope to secure assent to the 1928 Book or to any other, unless and until they have by some formal act of repudiation cleared themselves, and the Church of which they are the guardians, of complicity in the Modernist movement.'

Is this an ultimatum? Is it equivalent to a declaration that, if only the bishops will repudiate Modernism, they will have no more disciplinary trouble over Reservation? On the face of it, it is not a bad offer. Some of the bishops, worried and badgered as they are, may feel disposed to take it.

Still, the bishops are now off on holiday, and will feel better when they get back, and less disposed to be afraid of the

E.C.U.—that *malleus episcoporum*. And may we recommend every one of them, as he packs up, to slip into the episcopal handbag a copy of *John Inglesant*? It will make good holiday reading—better far than Edgar Wallace—and will remind them of an ideal of the Church of England at once spiritual and liberal, the only ideal which can justify our existence as a separate organization. For this ideal the Bishop of Birmingham, in spite of vilification, misrepresentation, and abuse, seems to us to be fighting hard. Cannot his brethren recognize that he is fighting *their* battle? If he goes down, the bishops will have no barrier between them and a flood of pious bigotry. He is a sort of breakwater against which the wave of holy frenzy breaks its force. But if the barrier is breached? We cannot view such a possibility without dismay, and the bishops, if they were in full possession of their wits, would tremble at the thought. His cause is *their* cause, and this is why their pusillanimity in Convocation makes the observer blush.

#### LONDON BRANCH OF THE MODERN CHURCHMEN'S UNION.

The following meetings have been arranged for the autumn by the London Branch. All members and their friends will be welcome.

Oct. 9th, 5.15 p.m. Church House.

‘Reunion from an Anglo-Catholic point of view.’

Rev. K. D. MACKENZIE, M.A., Secretary, Anglo-Catholic Congress, Home Association.

Oct. 29th, 8 p.m. Annual Public Meeting. Caxton Hall.

The Dean of St. Paul's in the Chair. Professor J. S. HALDANE and others will speak on ‘A Reasonable Religion.’

Nov. 19th, 5.15 p.m. Caxton Hall.

‘Reunion from a Free Church point of view.’

Rev. K. L. PARRY, B.Sc., Charlton Road Congregational Church, Manchester.

## EPISCOPACY AND REUNION

By the REV. J. S. BEZZANT, M.A., Fellow of Exeter College and  
Vice-Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

WITH the approach of another Lambeth Conference there is some revival of interest in Reunion between the English Church and the Nonconformist Churches. Prolonged discussion of such reunion has revealed the obstacle to it: the Ministry of the Church is the subject about which divergence of belief is intractable. The divergence is both of fact and of the interpretation of fact, of which the only surviving evidence are the records of the early Church.

On this subject the new book<sup>1</sup> by Canon Streeter is as important in content as apt in date. It is clear and fresh in style; great pains have been taken to resolve technicalities into simplicity; every clergyman should be able to read and to master it. Scrupulously impartial and in bondage neither to ecclesiastical tradition nor to the critics thereof, as a general survey it is the most important treatment of its subject of recent years. I propose to set out its main points and conclusions.

Step by step Canon Streeter re-examines the extant sources of information about the Ministry of the Primitive Church, beginning from Jerusalem and the Twelve Apostles. Of these latter, as little is known to history as much to legend. A whole series of apocryphal Acts of Apostles adds nothing of historical value to our scant knowledge of them. Early Christian writers read one another, and not infrequently attempted to supplement earlier information by the simple method of inferential addition. With no text-book of general Church history available,<sup>2</sup> the wonder is not that they made blunders, but that they did not make more. In spite of their difficulties and their natural tendency to exalt the Church, when fact was available they did not prefer legend. Inevitably there arose in the early Church a

<sup>1</sup> *The Primitive Church. Studied with special reference to the Origins of the Christian Ministry.* The Hewett Lectures, 1928. By B. H. Streeter. Macmillan and Co., Ltd. Price 8/6.

<sup>2</sup> Until Eusebius wrote, in the time of Constantine, the Fathers had no text-book of Church History.

demand for knowledge about 'the Twelve': the fact that in the second and third centuries this demand could only be met by a series of apocryphal *Acts* proves that no more was then known about them than is known now. Most of 'the Twelve' are mere names, and even the tradition of their names varied in different localities.

What did they do in the Primitive Church? The collection of sayings in *Matt.* x, 5 ff., beginning, 'Go not into any way of the Gentiles and enter not into any city of the Samaritans, but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel,' and giving as the reason for this limitation, 'Ye shall not have gone through the cities of Israel until the Son of Man be come,' would probably not have survived intact long enough to be incorporated into our first Gospel unless they reflected the actual procedure of 'the Twelve.' This is a clue as to what became of them, though there are other indications that they confined themselves to the house of Israel.<sup>3</sup> On one occasion Peter, James and John made it clear to Paul that if God had called *him* to evangelize Gentiles, *their* mission was to their own people (*Gal.* ii, 1 ff.).

'Here it is emphatically stated that—at a date at least sixteen, possibly as much as twenty, years after the Crucifixion—even Peter still regarded his mission as limited to "the circumcision."''

The later tradition that, after twelve years spent in Jerusalem preaching to the Jews, the Apostles separated in order to carry the Gospel to the Gentiles, is therefore baseless. Nor is there any evidence that Peter, though once willing to eat with Gentiles, ever changed his conception of his own call. As touching the law and the extent to which it was binding upon Christians, the Twelve, as it were 'a Christian School of Rabbis,' could speak with authority, by the commission of Christ.

'But in the Palestinian Church questions concerning doctrinal belief or ecclesiastical jurisdiction were simply not under consideration. If such questions had arisen, the Apostles would have been the natural persons to consult; but that was not the purpose for which it was supposed they had been called.'

I. The New Testament shows that the most important personage in the primitive Jerusalem church was not one of the Twelve, but James the Lord's brother; in the lifetime of Jesus this James did not believe in him, and once tried to restrain him

<sup>3</sup> *Matt.* xix, 28; *Luke* xxiii, 30; *Acts* i, 15 ff.

supposing that he was mad. There is no mystery about the position of James. To Jewish Christians Jesus was the national Messiah, and to the Jew both monarchy and priesthood were offices essentially hereditary in a sacred house. The most prominent male relative of Jesus became his Vicegerent by divine right until he came again; later, James' nephew, Symeon, was recognized by Jewish Christians as his successor. Had Christianity remained Jewish, 'it might have developed a Caliphate, hereditary in the family of James.' From the first, then, the government *in this church* was in fact, whatever it was in name, non-episcopal.<sup>4</sup>

It does not follow that the organization of Gentile churches was the same as that of Jerusalem; nor that it was of any one type—the creation of St. Paul. The evidence is quite conclusive that it was not. St. Paul was not the first to preach to Gentiles<sup>5</sup>; he was not the founder of the three great churches of Antioch, Alexandria and Rome. It is not likely, nor is there evidence, that even a majority of Gentile churches were founded by wandering apostles commissioned by the Twelve or by anybody else. Such churches would naturally be 'founded' by pilgrims to Jerusalem, who, like those at Pentecost, heard that the hope of Israel had been fulfilled, and returned home with the 'good news.' Churches so founded *must* have differed from one another indefinitely. If the Lord, the faith and the baptism were one, the content of that faith and its outward expression cannot but have varied enormously from place to place. Canon Streeter's conclusion is that '*the history of Catholic Christianity during the first five centuries is the history of a progressive standardization of a diversity which had its origin in the Apostolic Age.*'

Israel was always one, though in our Lord's day there were wide divergences in doctrine, thought and practice. The Church regarded itself as the true Israel. Two consequences follow. In theory the Church was one: only this made later standardization possible. On the other hand diversity and absence of definition caused small offence, and details of organiza-

<sup>4</sup> Streeter uses this term as implying the presidency of a single 'bishop' whose status is much more than *primus inter pares* among presbyters.

<sup>5</sup> See *Acts* xi, 20.

tion were unimportant. That there were wide differences is obvious. Throughout the second century the date of Easter was the subject of acute controversy: the difference clearly went back to the sub-apostolic period at least. Again, the agreements between the Synoptic Gospels are many—common sources were used: what of the startling divergences in the traditions of our Lord's birth and infancy, the genealogies and the resurrection appearances? Obviously there was wide local independence even on very important subjects. The same fact emerges from the study of MSS., of Liturgiology, and of the history of the formation of a New Testament Canon.

II. The study of the organization of Gentile Churches begins with Antioch. The evidence is that this church was *not* modelled on that of Jerusalem, perhaps deliberately. The first evidence is *Acts* xiii, 1 f. The occasion is a corporate act of the Church. It is revealed by the Spirit that Barnabas and Saul must do some special work; they are accordingly commissioned, with laying on of hands, and sent away to do it. The only church officers mentioned are 'prophets and teachers,' and they are mentioned by name. If it is said that, at this date, Antioch already had *episcopoi*, the onus of proof lies on those who make the assertion. Only an *a priori* theory can supply it.

The *Didache*<sup>7</sup> shows the next and natural development. Its writer knows of churches with bishops and deacons: he also knows of churches without them. In the latter, the ministry of prophets and teachers is breaking down, and these churches are thus advised: 'Appoint for yourselves, therefore, bishops and deacons . . . despise them not, for they are your honourable men, along with the prophets and teachers.' The aim of the *Didache* is two-fold. First, to create, where it did not exist, a resident ministry of bishops and deacons; secondly, to secure that, where this resident ministry did exist, it should no longer be treated as of subordinate importance. Moreover, the *Didache* encourages prophets to settle in local churches. When they did so, and on the terms suggested, they would easily and

<sup>7</sup> Streeter presents a strong case for connecting this document with Syria, possibly in the region of Antioch, and dates it about 90 A.D. If it is later and connected with some other church, then the extent of divergences in the Primitive Church were *greater* than Streeter maintains, and continued longer.

naturally attain the position of bishops. They could, if need so required, speak 'in the spirit,' *i.e.* with divine authority; they could give thanks at the Eucharist as much as they desired, and would thus become the normal celebrants of it; the faithful are exhorted to give the prophets first-fruits, 'for these are your chief priests.' When a single prophet settled, on these conditions, he would easily become a non-episcopos. Ignatius himself was a prophet. His enthusiastic defence of episcopacy, so far from proving that in his day it was universal in the Church, suggests more forcibly that it was not yet securely established. What nobody questions, nobody passionately defends. Nor is Ignatius contending for the supremacy of bishops as against unruly presbyters: the fight is for the supremacy of regular church officers as a body. With this accords the fact that, despite his blasphemous exaltation of the bishop, Ignatius says never a word about the *Succession*.

III. The ministry in churches founded by St. Paul shows a similar, but not identical, evolution: in the majority of them of which we have evidence, non-episcopacy was achieved more quickly. The Pauline Epistles give general confirmation to the statement of *Acts* that Paul and Barnabas appointed elders in every church.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless it is equally clear that these officials, in the earlier epistles, are of less importance than prophets and teachers. Necessities of discipline led to an advance in the status of the Episcopoi or Shepherds. The speech in *Acts* xx, 17 ff., is a 'we' section, and is therefore evidence for St. Paul's views. In it the same persons are addressed as episcopoi and presbyters: they are in a position of authority and responsibility, charged 'to feed the church of God.' The Johannine Epistles are also evidence for at least some of the same Asian churches. Diotrephes<sup>9</sup> both loves the pre-eminence and has it; it seems to involve a power of excommunication from the church. Clearly, then, in fact if not in name, a mon-episcopos was already established in one, if not in several, of the churches of Asia. 'The Elder' of II and III *John* not only addresses a letter to a church other than his own in terms almost as papal as parental, but he is of greater dignity than Diotrephes, while in

<sup>8</sup> On the *return journey* of the first missionary tour.

<sup>9</sup> See iii *John*.

I *John* he writes as the spiritual father of a large community. Whether 'the Elder' is John the Apostle, or, as is more likely and as Streeter thinks, 'the Elder' and 'disciple of the Lord'<sup>10</sup> mentioned by Papias, the conclusion is that mon-episcopacy was established in these churches by 100 A.D.

The Pastoral Epistles most probably emanate from Ephesus and are therefore further evidence for the state of things in Asia. They are, however, *later* than the establishment of mon-episcopacy in those churches. They are not the work of St. Paul, and are to be dated about 110 A.D. The author's chief concern is not with the *form* of church government, but with the *character* of church officers. The terms presbyter and episcopos are used ambiguously: they are to some extent interchangeable. This is probably intentional in order that the advice given might suit churches which had a mon-episcopal system and those which had not.

'Timothy and Titus are not actually described as Bishops (historic fact forbid this), but they are depicted as exercising the functions which, at the date of writing, were those of Bishops. Under these names is portrayed the ideal Bishop—in the one case of a large city, in the other of a country district.'

The most captious critic will hardly accuse Canon Streeter of minimizing the evidence for the early existence of mon-episcopacy. Although he is unable to accept the Petrine authorship of the First Epistle of Peter, he makes the suggestion—it is no more—that its author may have been the Aristion mentioned by Papias, and that he was Bishop of Smyrna. The exhortation to 'the elders' clearly implies that these were in a position to 'lord it over' the congregation; their position is in advance of anything implied by the Pauline Epistles. It would appear that a mon-episcopal system, for which Ignatius fought so strongly *elsewhere*, was in his day generally prevalent in *Asia*.

IV. For the primitive Church Order in Rome the information of Irenaeus is more precise than accurate. He says plainly that the church was 'founded and organized at Rome by the two most notable apostles Peter and Paul' who 'founded and built up the Church' and 'entrusted the ministration of the bishopric to Linus.' Irenaeus is contradicted by Tertullian, who states that

<sup>10</sup> This title possibly means one who had seen Jesus in the flesh.

Clement was appointed first bishop of Rome, and not by Peter and Paul, but by Peter. That Tertullian, who had read Irenaeus, should prefer what can be shown to be a less authentic source of information, shows that such statements are not to be accepted uncritically. Irenaeus himself requires to be read with caution, and his statement on this subject scarcely gains in credibility by its association with his declaration that Matthew wrote his Gospel in Hebrew. Though St. Paul did not 'found' the church at Rome, his influence on its thought must have been considerable. If the church order adopted at Rome was so influenced, we should naturally expect it to resemble that which, in St. Paul's day, existed at Ephesus and Philippi, churches which he had founded; that is, government, not by a single episcopos, but by a body of episcopoi who could also be called presbyters.

'If Peter was in Rome after Paul's death, it is *theoretically* possible that he then introduced a *new form* of church government. That possibility, however, shrinks to invisibility when we study the evidence available as to the state of affairs at Rome during the ensuing fifty years.'

Streeter connects the Epistle of James and that to the Hebrews with Rome. The church order of these documents is comparable to that implied by St. Paul's farewell speech to the Ephesian Elders. Mon-episcopacy was not yet, but the powers and responsibility of the regular ministry are strongly emphasized. Two other documents indisputably emanate from the early Roman Church—the genuine Epistle of Clement (written about 96 A.D.) from the Church of Rome to the Church of Corinth, and *The Shepherd* of Hermas.<sup>11</sup> According to *Clement* the church officers are episcopoi and deacons. The context of the usage of these names excludes the idea that 'presbyters' were an intermediate order: it is a collective term, connoting not so much office as status.' The letter of Polycarp to the Philippians shows that in this church also, as late as 115,<sup>12</sup> mon-episcopacy did not exist. The importance of *I Clement* is its conception of the nature and source of official authority.

<sup>11</sup> Streeter rejects the evidence of the *Muratorianum* that *The Shepherd* was written between 139—154 A.D. He maintains that the first four *visions* were written during the lifetime of Clement of Rome (c. 100) and the rest of the document by twelve years or so later.

<sup>12</sup> The time of Ignatius.

It affirms the principle of *apostolic succession* as the basis of such authority, though it is not a mon-episcopal succession. *The Shepherd* also shows that, in the lifetime of Clement, the Church of Rome was governed by a board of persons—‘the Elders’ or ‘the Elders that preside over the Church.’ This agrees with the off-noted fact that, although Clement writes in the name of the Roman church, he does not claim to be its bishop. He reproaches the Corinthian church for the sedition whereby certain of its presbyters had been wrongfully dispossessed of office, and the stress laid on discipline and obedience is supported by analogies drawn from the Roman army and from the Old Testament priesthood. Streeter points out how easily the latter analogy

‘lends itself to a non-episcopal interpretation of the nature and function of the Christian ministry that goes further than anything which, so far as we can judge, was actually in the mind of Clement when he wrote—and which may have been so interpreted by Ignatius.

‘Since Clement wrote little more than thirty years after the death of Paul . . . his statement that the existing college of presbyters was descended from that of Apostolic times by a method of co-optation by those already in office (subject to the consent of the people) is probably correct—so far as the churches of Rome and Corinth are concerned. Paul does seem to have appointed colleges of episcopoi and deacons, and to have attached a growing importance to their functions; and it is also clear from Polycarp’s Epistle to the Philippians that in the Pauline Church of Philippi the system of two orders only—presbyters and deacons—still survived in 115 A.D. What Clement does is not to invent facts, but to harden a practice really primitive into the basis of a theory of authority.’

*I Clement* contrasts with the *Didache* in that it regards the prophets as subordinate to the regular ministry. On the other hand Streeter might have made the point that though mon-episcopacy was clearly not established at Corinth when Clement wrote, he nowhere suggests that the Corinthian church order is in that point defective, nor realizes that a strong mon-episcopos was exactly what the church of Corinth required.

V. The most notable fact about the early history of the church of Alexandria is the dearth of evidence. Streeter attempts to fill the gap by connecting the so-called Epistle of Barnabas and the Second Epistle of Clement<sup>13</sup> with this church. Even so,

<sup>13</sup> As this document is strictly anonymous, Streeter calls it Dentero-Clement rather than Pseudo-Clement.

knowledge gains little. The most significant fact which emerges is that the author of II *Clement* was either a Reader, or else a presbyter entitled to speak as representing the body of presbyters. Streeter accepts the second alternative. It reveals the state of affairs at a time between 120 and 160 A.D. This evidence is thoroughly in harmony with the known fact that, in the third century, in Alexandria the mon-episcopos 'was elected by the twelve presbyters of the city churches, and was by them consecrated to his office'; and until *Demetrius* (c. 190 A.D.) the *Bishop of Alexandria* was the only bishop in Egypt. He initiated a new policy and appointed bishops in other cities.

After the death of Peter, James and Paul, and the destruction of Jerusalem, the theoretical ideal of a church, one and indivisible, was extremely difficult to realize in actual outward expression. Moreover the Roman government was very jealous of co-operation and combination and, after the Neronian persecution, Christianity was legally a *religio illicita*. Large-scale conference on disputed questions was impracticable. In the first two centuries, to hold anything like a provincial synod, much less an Oecumenical Council like those of later Church history, would have been quite impossible. Thus, though the great churches naturally secured a pre-eminence, it was rather of moral prestige than of legal right. So it is that, as Streeter expresses it with simile and epigram, 'the office of Archbishop would seem to be more primitive than that of Bishop.'

Such are the facts, and few of them are new. We turn from the Primitive Church to the modern English Church and reunion with the Nonconformist Churches.<sup>14</sup> In the way of such reunion, a doctrine of the Ministry is the chief obstacle. The doctrine is that Christ informed 'the Twelve' about the form and nature of the Ministry, or at least that from the Apostles' conception of its form and nature as revealed by their practice, we are bound to infer that it had divine approval and authority. The form was episcopacy. The nature was divinely authoritative for its authority was to be handed down in unbroken succession from the original Apostles to whom alone Christ gave

<sup>14</sup> The Church of Rome has made it clear that there is at present no hope of reunion with her. For that Church the word 'reunion' has no meaning other than unqualified submission to the Papal claims.

such authority to ordain. The doctrine has a corollary: no Christian society lacking Episcopacy thus commissioned can be really part of the Universal Church.

This doctrine is held by large numbers of the Anglo-Catholic party, and by those who speak for it. True, among its stoutest asserters one misses the names of such liberal Anglo-Catholic scholars as are learned in early Church History.<sup>15</sup> But the rank and file of Anglo-Catholicism remain unconscious of the fact that modern research requires the complete rejection of this clear-cut doctrine. Week by week this oblivion is sedulously encouraged by *The Church Times*. Thus:

‘No human consent can confer ordination. The Divine power was given by Christ to the Apostles, and transmitted by Apostolical Succession.’ Each local church was an extension of the Mother Church of Jerusalem, and the Apostolic Ministry presided over and directed all important decisions. The Bishop has inherited the authority of the Apostles and, like them, he speaks for Christ in ordination.<sup>16</sup>

The theory assumed to be true, and true of the entire early Church, it becomes easy to see in our Lord’s choice of ‘the Twelve’ a hierarchical distinction between Apostles and disciples. By the addition of a single sentence, thought is enabled to move, without the assistance of either fact or argument, to the assertion that this was a distinction between ‘official leaders’ and ‘general adherents.’ Another sentence, equally unsupported, achieves the desired result that the ‘familiar distinction between clergy and laity’ was already beginning and was of our Lord’s own making.<sup>17</sup> Thus are thousands of clergy encouraged in the delusion that modern knowledge confirms the opinions formed in their theological colleges, and that the work of Lightfoot, Hatch, Harnack, Sohm, Headlam and others, because not infallible, has no consequences of importance.

It is true (as we have seen) that in the Jerusalem church, James, the Lord’s brother, was like a mon-episcopos. That Jesus so appointed one who did not believe is as unlikely as it is without evidence. The idea that James received his position and authority from the Twelve, who alone could confer it, is equally unnecessary: in a Jewish community the position would

<sup>15</sup> I am not sure what these hold. Learning does not always compel its possessors clearly to proclaim its results.

<sup>16</sup> See *The Church Times*, May 17th, 1929, p. 597.

<sup>17</sup> *The Church Times*, May 25th, 1928, p. 617.

be his by right of family relationship. Equally unsupported would be a statement that Symeon, James' nephew, derived his position from the Apostles. St. Paul's language in *Galatians* makes it very unlikely that he ever regarded his authority and commission as given through other Apostles. Even if, on these points, assumption be given full rein, it would not affect the general conclusion to which the evidence leads :

'To understand the history of early Christianity, we must begin by eliminating from our minds the traditional picture of the Twelve Apostles sitting at Jerusalem, like a College of Cardinals, systematising the doctrine and superintending the organisation of the Primitive Church. They had a more urgent work to do. The Day of Judgement was at hand; their duty was to call men to repent before it was too late. When the Lord might any day return in glory, it was unprofitable to build up an organisation about which the one thing certain was that it was never meant to last.'<sup>18</sup>

Subsequent evidence supports this conclusion. In some churches mon-episcopacy was early established: in others it did not exist at all for a long time: in others there was a ministry of another form and nature<sup>19</sup> to which the episcopal elements, when they began to exist, were at first subordinate. The evidence in many cases is scanty; but we must build on our knowledge, not on our ignorance. It is the function of hypothesis to fit facts, not to alter them; and in the construction of historical knowledge an *a priori* hypothesis is of less value than one fact with which it conflicts. That in the Primitive Church prophets were commissioned with laying on of hands by someone who had received such authority to commission from Apostles is an assumption with no evidence to support it. The evidence is against it. Very soon it became essential to distinguish between true prophets and false: the test was not enquiry into the prophets' apostolical succession. If they were admitted in the succession without distinction between true and false, that credential was worthless: as far as evidence goes it was non-existent. Between the death of the Apostles and the Council of Nicaea hundreds of sees were formed; that all and every of these were originally filled only by men, whether prophets or episcopoi (singular or plural), who had been commissioned by

<sup>18</sup> *The Primitive Church*, p. 38.

<sup>19</sup> As Streeter points out, the idea that all prophets were 'wandering prophets' is a mistaken deduction from the *Didache*.

persons authorised by succession from Apostles to give their commission—that such persons consecrated the first mon-episcopos as a Bishop—all this rests upon a tissue of historical assumption equally huge and improbable. Only if this happened, that is to say, only on such assumptions, can anybody's succession be proved. As Streeter says, the evidence leads to

'one result from which there is no escape. In the Primitive Church there was no single system of Church Order laid down by the Apostles. During the first hundred years of Christianity, the Church was an organism alive and growing, changing its organisation to meet changing needs. Clearly in Asia, Syria and Rome during that century the system of government varied from church to church and in the same church at different times.'

The facts about the Primitive Church should encourage Christians to face present facts. One of these is that, whatever theory of the unity of the Church be held, Christianity no longer exists as a church, but as a collection of churches. No unity will be possible between churches so long as they are inspired by loyalty to the traditions of their fathers: the traditions are inconsistent, often contradictory. Of many of the divergences, however, it is no exaggeration to say that modern knowledge and modern views of the Bible have deprived them of all intellectual meaning. In the matter of the Ministry Episcopalians, Presbyterians and Congregationalists have all claimed that their Order was that of New Testament times. Each has been able to maintain his own case: none has been able to overthrow the case of the others. The explanation is that all alike proceeded on an uncriticized assumption that there was in the first century a single type of Church Order. That assumption is false. Of the controversies based upon it, Canon Streeter says, 'All have won, and all shall have prizes.' He might have added that in their attitude to others, 'All have been wrong and should acknowledge their error.' In particular, the doctrine of a divinely appointed ministry perpetuated to our own day by Apostolical Succession, should be disavowed as wrong. The position that the facts can be accepted and the doctrine maintained in a 'liberalized' form is hopeless: it is absurd to suppose that when historical theories have been abandoned a historical doctrine can still be defended which has no basis except those theories. The only defensible view of Episcopacy is that it

gradually became the form of ministry adopted throughout the Church; but it would be a tremendous claim that a form of organization, once accepted by a majority within or even by the whole Christian Society, is thereby stamped with divine authority and may never be departed from, even temporarily, by any part of the Society. Such a principle could only be defended on the most conclusive evidence that it was an explicit command of Christ. Neither the Apostles, nor the Primitive Church, ever made a claim even approximating to it.

No doubt many who read these words are convinced that the hindrances to reunion between the English Church and the Free Churches have little connexion with the essentials of the Christian religion or life. None the less, those who desire reunion have to deal with facts not as they ought to be, but as they are. Unless they are realists, the Christian excellence of their ideals will not secure their realization, nor avoid harm. In particular, it is unfortunate that their own enthusiasm does not exist as a living desire among masses of church-goers, conformist or nonconformist. One of the most formidable hindrances to reunion is that most of the living interest in it exists among those who are strongly opposed to it.

Again, such reunion will not *necessarily* prove a source of strength to the Church. It is doubtful if the condition of Non-conformity is even as healthy as that of the English Church. Nor will the world necessarily interpret reunion as a sign that the Church is putting first things first: it is as likely to regard it as a desperate act of despairing weakness. Nor are expectations of this sort the true grounds for preaching reunion. The true grounds are that reunion is right and disunion wrong, and because without justification, ridiculous.

Meanwhile English churchmen are in communion with those who still prize as truths the fictions of Apostolical Succession and the divine character of Episcopacy. Neither religion nor reason can defend hasty reunion with those at present outside the English Church at the cost of creating new and large divisions within it. There would be small gain if the Church were made impossible for large numbers who believe in Apostolical Succession. Education and plain teaching are imperatively necessary. Recognition of error is as difficult as apprehension

of truth, and confession of error is more difficult. None the less those who reject Apostolical Succession as a falsehood must deny it in season and out of season, and diffuse the knowledge which has undermined it, and at the counted cost of controversy. When a plan for reunion such as that proposed in South India is before the Church<sup>20</sup> we must reiterate in the plainest terms and without equivocation that there is nothing whatever in our knowledge of the mind of Christ or of the Primitive Church which can justify its rejection. Whether the inevitable controversy is an evil or not may be doubted : what is certain is that it can only be avoided by the silent toleration of greater evils—the perpetuation of false claims which inevitably issue in unrighteousness.

## PROFESSOR WHITEHEAD'S CONCEPTION OF GOD

By DOROTHY M. EMMET, B.A., Commonwealth Fellow, Harvard University.

IT has now become a commonplace to say that the teaching of philosophical science leaves room for moral and religious experience, and that materialistic determinism as a philosophical creed has sunk back into being but the obsolete fundamentalism of dogmatic science. But at the same time it is equally a commonplace to say that we are still looking for a *Weltanschauung* in which that experience finds a necessary place, and which includes a conception of a God that the modern world can worship as an integral part of that system, so that apart from Him it is meaningless.

This is why Professor Whitehead's metaphysical conception of God is of such interest and value. But to understand it, and the place that it occupies in his philosophy, it is necessary to understand the convictions with which he starts. The first of

<sup>20</sup> It is proposed that existing non-conformist ministers shall not be re-ordained, but that all new ministers of the United Church shall be episcopally ordained. Some 'irregularity' would thus continue for about thirty years : it is carefully provided, however, that the administration of sacraments by the non-episcopally ordained shall not take place in any congregation where it could cause offence to conscience.

these is a belief in the necessity and value of speculative cosmology. Modern philosophy he holds has fought shy of this for too long. It has mainly contented itself with making interesting reflections upon experience. And moreover it has, especially in America, to contend with the whole tendency to regard the making of metaphysical systems as not only futile, but mistaken, as the sole object of thinking is to be an instrument to solve the practical problems of living. This tendency is not unknown or unfashionable in the Church, especially among those who are rightly impatient at social strife and injustice, and are tempted to maintain that we need to throw theology to the winds and concentrate on the practical business of living together and loving each other in a Christian way. On the other hand, Prof. Whitehead gives us a defence of speculative systems of thought, and reminds us of the enormous survival value of such systems, apart from their intellectual interest and importance. Patristic theology formulated one; and the Church survived the Dark Ages; the mediaeval schoolmen and theologians formulated one; and it is still the philosophical foundation of Catholicism. We may not hold that these schemes were watertight; probably no such schemes ever are or ever will be. But who can doubt their value, their intellectual beauty, and their influence on the history of thought?

So though it may be true that we are living in what is predominantly an experimental and not an intellectual age, he bids us take our courage in both hands, and try to go forward to a *Weltanschauung* which embodies the implications of modern philosophical and scientific thought, in so far as we can judge them, and to enquire what sort of conception of the nature of God such a scheme will demand.

This brings us to a kindred conviction. Prof. Whitehead protests against what he calls the paying of metaphysical compliments to God. God should be an integral part of our metaphysical system, not dragged in as a *deus ex machina* to supply its deficiencies, and the same metaphysical principles which we apply to every actuality in our cosmology we must also be able to apply to God. We must not simply state that he is 'eminently real' in a sense in which other actualities are not; nor apply epithets such as 'infinite' and 'everlasting' in a different sense

from that in which they may be used elsewhere in our philosophy. People have usually shrunk from such a metaphysical examination of the nature of God out of reverence, and from the very widespread and on the whole unexceptionable view that 'He is rather the object of Worship in His Temple than of disputation in the Schools.' But Prof. Whitehead holds that if we are to have a cosmology in which God will be not only the object of a certain, perhaps irrational, kind of experience, but also an integral part of the scheme, so that it demands Him and is meaningless apart from Him, this reverence is a mistaken one.<sup>2</sup>

This bringing of the nature of God back within the scope of metaphysical discussion means of course going back behind Kant to a mode of approach more nearly akin to that of the Cartesians and of Spinoza; but the cry of 'Back to Spinoza,' for a restatement of the kind of metaphysic he gave in terms of modern knowledge, and to allow for a more thoroughgoing facing of the problem of the freedom of individual actualities, is one which we also hear from other quarters.<sup>3</sup>

That is why it is impossible to understand Prof. Whitehead's theology apart from his metaphysics. He is trying to work out how a thinker starting from the general point of view of Platonism, would state his metaphysics in the light of modern scientific knowledge. Then, by making everything from the most trivial puff of existence to God, exemplify, though of course not necessarily in the same degree, the same general principles which govern the scheme, he formulates a conception of God which performs a necessary function in that scheme.

Some of its underlying notions may be summarized as follows:

(a) We have a metaphysical ultimate that enters actuality by reason of its accidents. (This will be recognized as the part

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the attitude of Demaea, the orthodox theologian, in Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, a work which Prof. Whitehead finds of great interest, as showing the inevitably negative conclusion of a certain line of argument in natural theology.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Science and the Modern World*, p. 216. 'Nothing within any limited type of experience can give intelligence to shape our ideas of any entity at the base of all actual things, unless the general character of things requires that there be such an entity.'

<sup>3</sup> E.g., Lloyd Morgan in *Life, Mind and Spirit*, and perhaps from Prof. Alexander.

played in the older philosophies by the concept of Substance.) This is called Creativity, and is something like the Aristotelian *δύναμις* in being pure potentiality, blind, shifting, indeterminate, but able to become actual under determining conditions.

(b) Then we have the notion of an actuality, which can be defined as a determination of creativity, through a process of becoming or experiencing a gradual growth into a unified self.<sup>4</sup>

(c) What gives creativity the impetus to become a process of self-determination? Prof. Whitehead holds that this is only possible if the first creature is a non-temporal actuality, which will be an antecedent ground conditioning the process of the becoming of temporal actualities.<sup>5</sup> This he calls the 'Primordial Nature of God,'<sup>6</sup> and describes it as the conceptual realization, *i.e.* the surveying in thought of the possibilities which are capable of harmonious concurrent realization, with the richest depth of contrast and originality which can be conceived apart from mutual inhibition, before the actualities in the process of the temporal world. These possibilities are called 'Eternal Objects,' and are somewhat akin to the Platonic Ideas, with two main modifications :

(a) The eternal objects are the vision of the harmonious system of the possibilities before the temporal world. They are thus not separate substances,<sup>7</sup> but a realm of inter-related hierarchies of forms, and this realm again is but a description of the primordial nature of God.<sup>8</sup> This view of the status of the forms as 'conceptually realized' in God<sup>9</sup> is an attempt to avoid both

<sup>4</sup> This notion clearly demands further elucidation than the scope of the present article permits. I can only refer to the discussion of one idea of organisms in *Science and the Modern World*, Chapter 6; and we may hope that Prof. Whitehead will give us a still more detailed discussion in his forthcoming Gifford Lectures, *Process and Reality* (Macmillan).

<sup>5</sup> *Religion in the Making*, p. 137.

<sup>6</sup> 'Primordial' is used to connote *beyond*, not *before* time. It is the conception of God as First Cause, before time, and creating the world out of nothing, that Prof. Whitehead holds to have been fatal in natural theology.

<sup>7</sup> The difficulties of this were of course known to Plato, since he brings them up in the *Parmenides*. But he does not seem to have been able to offer any solution.

<sup>8</sup> *Religion in the Making*, p. 138.

<sup>9</sup> Is it possible here to suggest a parallel with St. Augustine's view of the Ideas as existing in the Mind of God?

the extreme realist view of their independent existence, and also that still more degenerate modern form of Platonism which describes them as 'subsisting,'<sup>10</sup> which seems to be a contrivance to get all the advantages of the existence of universals, while avoiding the difficulties by a verbal trick, a sort of metaphysical representation without taxation.

(b) The relation of the forms to the temporal world is that of potentialities relevant to actualities. This avoids the difficulty of Platonism of minimizing the importance and the reality of the process of the temporal world, and so extolling Mathematics above History. It means that the forms and the temporal flux require each other; the flux can only attain order and determination by participation in the forms; and the forms only exist as relevant for realization in the process of becoming.

Actualities in the temporal world are therefore to be described as processes of becoming, whereby sheer creativity gains determination, character, order.<sup>11</sup> And in so far as it does this, it is by the realization of the possibilities which are surveyed in God's nature. We have therefore two notions: creativity, and God, whose 'primordial nature' is the vision of all the possibilities before the temporal world in so far as these can form a system of aesthetic harmony. In this way He is somewhat akin to Aristotle's Prime Mover. He is not behind the world, creating it as its First Cause, but He is as it were beyond it, drawing it to Himself by the sheer attraction of the vision, which claims our worship as the supreme object of desire.

This is also akin to Prof. Alexander's view,<sup>12</sup> where God is always the next stage, the next higher empirical quality to that attained in the course of emergent evolution. But according to Prof. Alexander, He is not actual; He is, to use a phrase of Prof. Whitehead's, 'The immediate object of the appetite of the world,' but this is but the next ideal to which the universe

<sup>10</sup> For instance, in particular, Santayana's *Realm of Essence*.

<sup>11</sup> This means that an actuality cannot be fully described apart from teleology. We have on the one hand the description of it as arising from the background of the system of all other actualities, and so conditioned by them. And, on the other hand, the description of it as a process of self-formation demands the conception of it as organising the data presented to it in the light of purpose and valuation, both of which involve emotion. This is why the worship of God is always tinged with emotion.

<sup>12</sup> *Space, Time and Deity*.

strains, and when this is attained, it will be the next again. But Prof. Whitehead brings in what he calls his Ontological Principle, which he applies throughout his metaphysic; namely, that any relation of relevance of one thing to another can only hold between actualities. So the relation of the world to God must not be that of an actual process to the ideal it sets before itself, but of actuality to actuality, and the nature of the relation is to be defined purely in terms of desire.

This brings us to two fundamental general ideas in Whitehead's metaphysics, namely, those of Relation and of Desire. To start with the former. He gives us a thoroughgoing philosophy of organism, in which the notion of individual substances as unchanging substrata of change, with accidental qualities, and related to each other externally—'units at arms' length'<sup>13</sup> is entirely discarded in favour of that view of the world as a completely inter-related system, which modern relativity physics demands. (He tries to avoid the difficulties of Monism by the view of actualities as centres of experience, processes of becoming through a creative synthesis of their relations, and so with a certain relative independence, though conditioned by the general nature of the system in the background.) But if we extend this view of Relation to that of the world to God, it will mean that Theology cannot be couched in legalistic terms. As in the case of every other relation, that between God and the world will be one of immanence and interpenetration. And since all relations are reciprocal, as God is immanent in the world, so the world will be immanent in God: as God transcends the world, so the world will transcend God. This means that just as what order and harmonious purpose we can see in the world is the result of actuality fulfilling the highest possibilities it sees before itself, which is the vision of God as relevant for it, and may be described as the richest depth of contrast which admits of harmonious achievement, so this is the bringing into actuality of God as immanent in the temporal world. (This is what Whitehead calls the 'consequent,' as distinguished from the primordial, nature of God.) But as the order and aesthetic harmony in the world becomes part of the nature of

<sup>13</sup> To use a phrase of Bosanquet's, in *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*.

God, as He is everlasting and out of time, so also it is conserved in Him on its non-temporal side of valuation, as everlasting.<sup>14</sup> This is the sense in which we must understand a paradoxical remark of Prof. Whitehead's, that God does not make the world, but He saves the world.

But as God transcends the world, in that He holds before it the vision of an amazing wealth of possibilities at which it has as yet scarcely begun to glimpse, so the world transcends God. Whitehead's view is no pantheism. The order in the world is not complete and all-pervasive. We see a measure of order and harmony, and a measure of disorder, a maze of cross purposes. This is because to Whitehead, as to other leaders of scientific philosophy, it is possible to trace a germ of the relative independence which will one day be freedom right down to the molecule. So we have the possibility of the fragmentary, short-sighted, self-centred purposes from whence come evil; and on the other hand we have the possibility of response to 'the one purpose whose fulfilment is eternal harmony.'<sup>15</sup>

This view of the immanence of God in the world as the principle of such aesthetic order as is achieved, and of God as transcendent as the vision of what may be achieved, leads to the various definitions which Whitehead gives us of God, which, while they fasten themselves in the mind, and come back with increasing significance and richness of implication, may have seemed at first to some of us a little difficult to understand as derivative from one general idea. Thus we read that God is 'the Principle of Concretion,'<sup>16</sup> 'the Kingdom of Heaven,'<sup>17</sup> the antecedent ground conditioning every creative act, 'the ideal companion who transmutes what has been lost into a living fact within His own nature,' 'the mirror which discloses to every creature its own greatness,'<sup>18</sup> 'the perpetual vision of the road

<sup>14</sup> This, it may be noted, seems to me to be the only type of philosophical approach to the question of Immortality which is possible in view of the modern difficulties in the way of any kind of belief in a disembodied soul.

<sup>15</sup> *Science and the Modern World*, p. 239. This passage gives the best summary I know of Whitehead's theology, but it must be insisted that its paradoxes can only be understood in the light of his metaphysics.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 216.

<sup>17</sup> *Religion in the Making*, p. 138.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 139.

that leads to the deeper realities,'<sup>19</sup> 'the element in virtue of which our purposes extend beyond values for ourselves to values for others,'<sup>20</sup> the 'organ of novelty,' and of new creative advance, 'the poet of the world.'<sup>21</sup>

Our relation to God, Prof. Whitehead holds, can best be described in the language of the Alexandrine school of early Christian theology.<sup>22</sup> This is why he makes what appears the somewhat sweeping statement that if the modern world is to find God it will be with the help of John and not of Paul.<sup>23</sup> The Platonic conception of Immanence and Transcendence and interpenetration, which appeared in the Johannine and Alexandrine theology, was overcome in the evolution of Christian thought in favour of a legalistic trend, in which the relations of each individual to others, which were conceived as separate substances, 'units at arm's length,' had to be kept in harmony by laws imposed by a supreme authority.

With this notion of immanence and complete interpenetration of one thing in another, we come to the second fundamental notion to which I drew attention above, namely, that of *desire*. Prof. Whitehead has used the term 'prehension' for relation, which is a happy choice, as standing midway between the idea of a relation as something mechanical and passive, and 'apprehension,' which suggests consciousness. Prehension has the connotation of activity, of the grasping of one thing by another so that each enters into the nature of the other. And since we learn that even physics is now becoming organic rather than mechanistic, we want this notion of a relation which carries with it the element of biological feeling and activity, even in the case of the most rudimentary forms of existence. Prof. Whitehead calls this Appetition, and we may trace its beginnings in the rudimentary attraction of molecules for each other up through

<sup>19</sup> *Religion in the Making*, p. 142.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 142.

<sup>21</sup> Expressions used in lecture.

<sup>22</sup> The reason for this is clear from even a very slight acquaintance, which is all the writer of this paper can claim, with the writings of the Christian Platonists of Alexandria, and especially of Origen. The rejection and condemnation of the latter, who was surely the greatest philosophical mind and perhaps one of the greatest spiritual geniuses, in its early history seems to me one of the Church's tragic mistakes.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 62, 64.

its gradual emergence into consciousness, and its purification into the supreme desire for God. And this desire, for Prof. Whitehead as for Aristotle, is the sole force by which God is drawing the world to Himself.

What we call Progress therefore is not inevitable, neither is it forced. It is always the result of the achievement in actuality of a type of order which is the aspect of God's nature seen as relevant for that process of becoming; and in the whole history of the cosmos, in which 'the physical world as we at present know it will be represented by a ripple barely to be distinguished from non-entity,'<sup>24</sup> many types of order may arise and decay. To the modern world, which must measure its times and its distances in terms of light years, the friendly, compact universe of the old cosmology has gone for ever. But Prof. Whitehead reminds us that it simply means that we must take courage, and go forward to a correspondingly larger conception of the wonder of God's nature, as the vision of the countless types of order which have arisen and may yet arise, with their infinite variety and underlying harmony, and through participation in Whom, He in us, and we in Him, each type or order, though it passes in the temporal flux, on its finer side is preserved.<sup>25</sup>

This is of course a very brief and inadequate sketch of a great subject. But the main point I have tried to make clear is the essentially metaphysical angle from which Prof. Whitehead approaches it. Hence it is of little use to pick out scattered remarks from his books and criticize or expatiate on them. His conception of God must be looked on as an integral part of his metaphysical scheme, and it must be judged in the light of that scheme, and not according to whether it can be fitted into other theological systems. It claims to be a prolegomenon to theology from a certain philosophical standpoint, and it is as such that it will probably be of most value and interest to students of philosophy and theology.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 144.

<sup>25</sup> Among these, the type or order we know as Personality would doubtless be included in the nature of God, and is the highest of which we have knowledge. But this should not be taken to mean that it is the only possible and ultimate type.

## THOUGHTS ON THE CHURCH

## VII. CHURCH AND STATE.

By the Rev. J. C. HARDWICK.

THE Church of England as an independent organization may be said to owe its existence to a political revolution, *i.e.* the establishment in England of the typical renaissance tyranny of Henry VIII. Furthermore, its constitution and even its theology were the direct result of the peculiar political and religious conditions of the country at the time of the Elizabethan settlement. In brief, political exigencies gave to our Church its present constitution, liturgy and formulation of doctrine. If proof of this were needed, it would be found in the fact that so long as the English political constitution remained more or less insecure and unsettled, *i.e.* from the close of Henry VIII's reign until 1688, the constitution, liturgy and even doctrine of the Church were liable to change. But from that date until the Reform Bill period, when the Church was the object of determined attack, along with the rest of the social and political *status quo*, it was the most secure and unchanging of national institutions. There was no need to sing 'The Vicar of Bray' in the eighteenth century; during this English age of the Antonines, the Church was regarded as part of the Constitution — as indeed it might well claim to be.

Nowadays, however, it does not appear to be the case that political changes have corresponding effects upon the constitution of the Church. It is true that the Church and the Conservative Party have been thought to be twin forms of one thing, and the identification has not been invalidated in spite of the dissemination of socialist views among clergymen which their laity have not shared. And with regard to the other parties, they will leave the Church alone so far as they can, since religious questions have the reputation of scalding those who touch them. Moreover, the Church's political opponents (if we may so term them) do not regard the *status* of the Church as a political issue of sufficient importance to compensate them for the trouble in-

volved in raising it. One does not upset a bee-hive without some very adequate reason. Thus the Church, unless it asks for interference by the State, or in some way deliberately challenges the State's supremacy, is unlikely to become the object of Parliamentary or political attention. There exists no actively hostile party; of course, were the Church voluntarily to request that its privileges should be withdrawn, only a minority of politicians would hesitate to grant what was desired.

These milder climatic conditions may be due to the diminished interest in religious affairs generally which we are accustomed to deplore. In our day religion hardly constitutes the same vital political issue as it did in the days of the Tudor or Stuart dynasties or the Commonwealth *régime*. Governments tend to leave religion alone and to concentrate upon those social questions where our hearts lie. Nowadays the orthodoxies and heresies are economic; Communism and not Popery is the enemy—Lenin, not Philip II. But although this may be true, it is nevertheless pretty certain that political developments in this country are bound to affect the future of the Church of England, as a little reflection will suggest. Apart from the possibility that a Liberal or Labour Government might feel it worth while to disestablish the Church of England, which would effect nothing less than a revolution in its character and constitution, there are other possibilities even more serious.

No one who takes note of present political events in Europe can overlook certain disturbing tendencies. In spite of the fact that the War put an end to the three largest despotic European Governments and inaugurated a period of republicanism and democracy, it seems evident that political liberty is tending progressively to diminish. Government tends to become increasingly bureaucratic, and extensions of the franchise are more than compensated by the diminution of its value. To double the number of votes is to halve the value of each; and now that the manufacture of mob opinion is so well understood, those who control the means of propaganda have the majority of votes at their command. The consequence is that in ostensibly democratic countries like England and America, public opinion can be utilized as an engine of repression. Indeed, in America such utilization has already gone to considerable lengths. But in

addition to this certain countries, such as Italy and Russia, have repudiated the democratic ideal altogether. In neither of these countries can political liberty be said to exist.

If the question be asked what this has to do with the Church of England, the reply is that the connection between religion and political liberty has always been of the closest character. What strong governments aim at is to control public behaviour in the public interest. This can be done either by terrorism, which is effective whilst it lasts, but can never last for long; or by imposing uniformity of opinion, since opinion controls behaviour. If you can get people to believe what you wish, you can get them to do what you wish. Hence the value of the guillotine, the firing squad, castor oil, and the newspaper syndicate. They are all means to the same end—a disciplined population.

Historically, religion has been very often, perhaps generally, on the side of repression and the big battalions. Hence Voltaire's advice *écrazer l'infame*, and his pious hope that he might live to see the last king strangled in the entrails of the last priest. In other cases, however, religion has been on the side of political liberty, as in the case of the rise of the Dutch Republic, or in the case of the Scottish Covenanters. The reason why religion can be a source of great danger to all political tyrannies is that it constitutes an independent authority within the State, an *imperium in imperio*. It forms an independent centre around which a public opinion can crystallize which is not amenable to State control. It was the realization of this elementary fact which made pre-Reformation Englishmen make pilgrimages to the tomb of St. Thomas-à-Becket in spite of the weaknesses of that vain ecclesiastic's character. He stood as a symbol of liberty.

Of course in the mediaeval period the Church, as an international organization in the possession of immense wealth, and having a monopoly of learning, culture and administrative ability, was in a far stronger position as against the secular State, which was correspondingly weak, than any Church could be to-day. It was not until English government under Henry VIII became centralized, efficient, and as unprincipled as its opponent that the Church could be dealt with. But a Church,

so long as it remains a Church at all, retains some measure of autonomy and is a centre of independent life. It is therefore, however weak or reduced, a thing with which all governments have to reckon. Discontent may crystallize round it, and it may become a centre of disaffection.

In indicating the possibility of a future clash between Church and State, it is not to be supposed that any reference is intended to the Prayer Book controversy, which was a mere bagatelle. We have in mind the possibility of a much more serious clash, when it might become a matter of State policy actually to suppress the Church, so that bishops, instead of suffering mild rebuffs, for which they had certainly been asking, might find themselves in gaol. This is by no means a fantastic supposition.

It may be said that England is not Mexico, which of course is happily true. But nevertheless it is true also that times change, and we with them; nor are the changes invariably in the right direction. If our reading of certain present political tendencies in Europe and America is not entirely wide of the mark, we have to entertain the possibility that during the next century or so we may experience in England radical changes of political outlook and behaviour. We may, for example, be fated to enjoy the advantages of a Facist *régime*, or we may find ourselves herded into the millenium by means of a Dictatorship of the Proletariat. And under either of these dispensations, or under any other similarly subversive of traditional English ideals, the Church of England would necessarily be deeply affected.

Both Facist and Proletarian *régimes*, though superficially dissimilar, have a good deal in common, and especially their hostile attitude towards freedom of thought and expression. Even the Spanish Inquisition, in its palmy days, could have given very few points to the idealists of Moscow. The trouble with dictatorships of every brand is that, having gained control of the State, they tend to deify it, since it embodies their own ideals, and self-deification is a thing we are all prone to. They can permit no rival deities; and all institutions or organizations, political or religious, which seem reluctant to submit must go

by the board. The ideal of an *imperium in imperio* does not commend itself to absolutists :

*cum solos credat habendos  
Esse deos quos ipse colit.*

Thus, under an autocracy, one is supplied, not only with provisions and police, but with opinions ; one is guarded against 'all evil thoughts which may assault and hurt the mind.' Church and Press alike are reduced into organs of government propaganda or suppressed. If well-behaved, clergy and journalists become members of the Civil Service with assured incomes and pensions ; if ill-behaved, they go into gaol when lucky enough to escape being lynched. Under such circumstances, whether it were the object of patronage or persecution, the Church of England would have experienced a change of condition amounting to transformation. Whether bishops were fat and well-liking under a system of State patronage, or whether, like their progenitors, they lurked in dens and caves of the earth, their position would be sadly changed from what it now is : officials of an institution enjoying a high public prestige and an almost complete measure of freedom.

The Church of Rome, of course, is pretty well used to conflicts with the secular Government, and has evolved an elaborate policy of *revanche* and obstruction which meets with a large measure of success. But it is to be remembered that the Church of England, in a situation of this sort, is not so advantageously placed as an international and highly disciplined organization like the Church of Rome, which is an army no less formidable for being without arms. Consider, in history, the power and effectiveness of an Order like that initiated by Ignatius Loyola, himself a soldier and a fanatic. *Les jésuits n'ont jamais rien inventé ; ils ont toujours tout employé.* Altogether without originality, they have been princes among opportunists ; they engineered the Counter-Reformation, and thus created post-Tridentine Catholicism, something quite different from the Medieval Church. Could any body of devout Anglicans in the same way make Europe tremble ? The idea raises a smile. A Facist régime would find half the bishops, and more than half the clergy, and nearly all the faithful laity on its side. In any

case there would never be a united body to enter the battle against it. But the great weakness of the Church of England in any such struggle would not be a lack of *personnel*, however grave that might be, but the fact that a merely national institution is gravely handicapped in fighting a national government. The strength of Rome is that it is the Black International, as effectively organized as the Red, and a great deal more united and better disciplined.

Of course it may very well be that the optimists are right, and that we shall not have to endure the benefits of an autocracy, Red or White. And it is devoutly to be hoped that this is so. At the same time, what was said above holds good, that there is a tendency displayed throughout Europe and America for the central national Government to concentrate more and more power in its own hands. It is not at all an uninteresting fact that the rise of strong national governments in Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries synchronised with the invention of gunpowder, which made government easier for those who possessed the necessary explosives. And the reflection suggests itself whether tanks, aeroplanes, and poison gas may not be heralding a new era of governmental discipline. A barricade of overturned carts strengthened by a few paving-stones used at one time to give considerable trouble to the authorities, and indeed such things before this have brought down governments; but they would be quite useless to-day. Nowadays, it might be possible with comparative ease to wipe out a whole disaffected town should it be thought necessary to do so in the public interest. A tank would walk through a street barricade, so dear to the Parisian politician, as easily as a motor-car can run over a pedestrian. The only effective means of defence, adequate artillery, is beyond the resources of the *canaille*, unless they can corrupt the soldiers themselves; and as these in the case of mechanized warfare will tend more and more to become professionalized, there will be less and less chance of this in the future. The abolition of national armies, so much desired by pacifists, removes the last barrier against absolutism.

These considerations may serve to indicate the kind of issue that might arise between a strong centralized government and a section of minority opinion embodied in a Church. At pre-

sent we find it difficult to imagine that any Government, at least in England, would resort to measures of repression that would provoke a protest from the Church; but there is no saying what may happen fifty years from now. Furthermore, a Christian Church might take it into its head to denounce the use of poison gas or aerial bombs in warfare; or, indeed, might denounce war altogether, and this not in time of peace, but when war was imminent or actually in progress. It might be necessary to shoot a bishop or two to bring their co-religionists to reason. And even then the poison of pacifism might spread and render all the efforts of a militarist and patriotic government nugatory. There are plenty of sources of strife between Church and State which might arise at a critical moment; and if both sides were equally determined, there is no knowing what might happen.

Altogether, apart from war and civil tumult, State and Church might get at loggerheads over other issues of equal importance. A strong Facist Government might conceivably be converted to a drastic eugenist programme, such as our progressive advocates of the new scientific paganism are already clamouring for. And a Church might make a stand for the liberty of the individual, the sanctity of personality, and so on. This would not be a squabble over a rubric or the right of entry into an elementary school, but a fight for something vital about which men will gladly give their bodies to be burned. It is obvious, too, that a government of financiers or big business men would hesitate to permit the dissemination of such heresies as Christian Socialism. Lombard Street would inevitably dictate our theology, and bishops would either have to get on with it or get out.

But there is another avenue of State development besides that of a Red or White dictatorship. It may be that the State, instead of increasing its powers, may decide to reduce them, leaving as many sides of the national life as possible to flourish in independence of itself. This is not likely to happen until the State has ceased to fear enemies beyond, and within, its own frontiers, *i.e.* the foreign militarist and the domestic anarchist. But times may change, and security may settle down over Europe. The possibility is, perhaps, still rather remote, but it should be entertained; and foreign and domestic calm would

certainly involve a reduction of State powers, for these are only tolerated now because they afford some protection against aggression and chaos.

If this consummation of a radical reduction of State powers and pretensions should be reached, the Church, presumably, would become a cultural society organizing its own life in its own way, with infinite benefit to that life *if internal freedom were preserved*. But the trouble, of course, with a Church is that when the State withdraws control, minorities within the Church, which have grown and subsisted under the shadow of State protection, are at once eliminated. A free Church invariably displays its freedom by conducting a domestic purge, thus eradicating from itself every creative element.

Nor is this the only possibility. If the State voluntarily becomes weak, the Church (especially if it is an international organization) may easily become too strong; and a spiritual is no less deleterious than a secular tyranny. The dictatorship of the priest might hardly be preferable to that of the financier, the soldier, or the demagogue. Indeed, it might be far worse: for whereas carnal tyrants are satisfied with our goods, spiritual guardians want our souls also. The priest on horseback is a terrible fellow: those who doubt it should study the administration of the Papal States before the impious Garibaldi overthrew that holy *régime*.

Still, a Church infected internally by the spirit of liberalism might easily profit from freedom from State control. It would be free to live, change and grow, as a healthy organism should. But is a *liberal* Church a strange centaur which never has existed, and never could? One cannot say. The Quakers are an example which makes it possible to hope that the idea is not utterly chimerical. Yet the Quakers have no creeds.

## CHRIST AND PRE-HISTORY\*

By M. C. BURKITT, M.A., F.S.A., University Lecturer in the Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology, Cambridge.

**P**RE-HISTORY is the study of mankind in the most ancient past, and such a study must of necessity modify our more orthodox religious ideas. How far and in what directions is this the case?

In the first place I must ask you to accept certain axioms. We hear a good deal to-day about relativity; about the frailty or rather unreality of our sense perceptions, through which alone we are able to comprehend something about ourselves and the world around us; about the non-existence of space and time. In the realm of ultimate reality all this is no doubt very important, but after all from our point of view these problems are secondary considerations. We may be phantoms in a phantom world, or each others hallucinations, all may be 'Maya,' or illusion, as the Indians say. But there are degrees of 'Maya,' and from our immediate point of view to-day, and we believe in all probability to-morrow, the world is a very real place where a man gets nothing for nought and very little for sixpence; a place where blows and kindnesses are equally given, and where we all, whether our sense perceptions are reliable or not, react in a similar manner—most of us, should we place our hands by chance on a red-hot poker, act and speak in the same way! To ourselves also we are real and our attitude to our surroundings is both important and interesting. For me at any rate the higher physics and the higher philosophies are enthralling, but they deal with problems which do not affect us immediately.

We will start therefore with a belief, as far as we are concerned, in time, space, individualities and personalities, and in the validity of the sense perceptions and reasoning faculties of men and women.

A knowledge of the ancient past and the part played in it by our forerunners, of their outlook on life and its problems, becomes important in the great study of Man—next to the study

\* A Lenten address given at All Saints Church, Cambridge, in 1929.

of God the chief object of all intellectual effort. Further, if we accept the validity of the teleological argument—if we, looking at the world as someone looks at an engine in Cambridge station, admit the certainty of a creator or manufacturer of what is in front of us and the probability that it has not been made without some purpose—the study of humanity's past is in large part a study of God and His purpose as it is being worked out through each succeeding age.

But at the very beginning may I plead my own difficulties in presenting pre-history to you in this connection. Our outlook on life as adults is the result of impressions which are many of them intangible and cannot be retailed to you as a series of unemotional facts. Even if in the short time we are together I could give you all the facts, how could I convey all the impressions! The vast antiquity of civilized man, the growth and decay of civilizations, often largely as a result of climatic changes which man was powerless to control; these are now facts of knowledge as revolutionary to our outlook on life as the discovery of Copernicus that the earth was not the centre of the universe. Who can set down in words the effect of seeing for the first time the frescoed ceiling at Altamira, executed by artists at different periods between ten and twenty thousand years ago! How can mere reproductions and slides thrown upon a lantern screen convey to you the wonder of the originals and the realization that they were connected with 'sympathetic magic,' and that they represent a definite stage in the spiritual evolution of man, in the development of the conception of the ONE God. Again some of you may have seen the glorious finds from the royal tombs at Ur shown recently at the British Museum—the exquisite gold diadem, the standard, the gold and silver cups, the stringed instruments, etc., etc. Yet those objects and the culture they postulate were but the result of, or at least made possible by, climatic changes in the north of the northern hemisphere when the cyclonic belt, which gives us our damp weather, was forced further south over areas such as the Sahara, Mesopotamia, eastern Iran, and the Indus basin, areas many of them largely desert to-day. Conditions then being favourable, a development of peoples, having in them the germs of artistic feeling and perhaps suitably crossed so that the necessary vigour

was not absent, was very rapid and had reached before 3,000 B.C. a level which we might envy to-day. The climate changed; where is that civilization?

Our own civilization in western Europe we somehow usually treat as eternal; those who say that it is not are branded as pessimists. But is it? Anyhow, is it worth so much more than the many that have preceded it? After all it consists chiefly in the discovery of means of transport. We transport ourselves, our goods, and our voices by train, motor-car, aeroplane, telephone, and wireless—methods of utilizing Nature not known in the old days. But is this a real progress in civilization? It depends on a definition of the word. The results include immense towns (and slums), not to speak of a vast increase in population (and unemployment). London without our means of transport could hardly last a month. But of the truer products of a high civilization, such as artistic development, what have we to show to-day? At least our immediate ancestors could point to stately cathedrals reared to the glory of God, and for a few decades Germany produced music never before or since surpassed. But what of to-day? Well, we need not recount the glories of an age where the craftsman, in love with his work, which was offered as a sort of sacrament to his Creator, is replaced by the workman prepared to do as little as possible for the largest wage. No, let us not boast of our own days; our civilization is going the same way as all the others before it, probably as a result of natural forces which, being so close to them, we are but dimly able to gauge. Ours is but the latest of many that have gone before.

Yet is that quite true? Through it all is not God slowly working out some unknown purpose? When we study closely the story of long-past civilizations, their rise and fall, can we not follow a thread of real purpose, of God's willed progress which continues throughout and does not rise and fall with the rest? Such a thread of progress is seldom what we are usually prepared to boast about. To-day our own sentimental age shudders at pain and exaggerates the importance of the individual life, it emphasizes justice and comfort for the individual without considering the needs of the race. That is hardly a point of view likely to survive. But the true thread of His purpose is as elusive as God Himself. Before we can begin to disentangle it from the

rest it is necessary both to accumulate facts and to stand apart in order to be able to survey them in a true perspective so as to gain a vision of the whole. Ought we not to look for such a thread in the realm of spiritual rather than material advances. Many material discoveries such as agriculture and the domestication of animals or inventions such as metallurgy and the wheel, once made are never wholly forgotten even during the dark ages following the downfall of one of the great civilizations of the past. But while such discoveries and inventions help mankind to live more easily and securely, it is only when they enable individuals to exist with greater leisure that they are, in my opinion, to be connected with progress. Because without leisure for contemplation there can be no progress; but this leisure must be used aright. We should never condemn the existence in the world of so-called leisured classes, but we may well curse them if their great opportunity is frittered away. Leisure when utilized for contemplation has been the greatest handmaid of spiritual development which, if not itself a part of the real purpose, is at any rate necessary for an appreciation of it. Turning, then, to the realm of spiritual discoveries, let us note for example how primitive religion apparently grew out of magic, that much maligned word which when properly used conveys no idea of cheating or chicanery, having been rooted, I feel sure, in contemplation of the great elemental facts of birth and death, combined with a passionate desire for the essential of human life, namely, food. Hence developed an awe or fear of the controlling forces of Nature, which easily became deified and had to be propitiated. The next stage gives us the tribal god, greater because stronger than the gods of other tribes. Think for a moment of the conception of Jehovah held by the early Israelites. Finally there emerges the idea of a single universal God who, thanks it seems to the Mitani, that alas all too little-known people who lived to the south-east of the great Hittite empire, was conceived of as an ethical being. Such evolutions of thought have surely been in the line of real progress and constitute, some of us believe, steps in the development of our knowledge of the Creator and His Will.

But a warning must be sounded. There are many such apparent evolutions in thought and action which will be found

perhaps to be illusory and in the long run false. There are many Spirits to be tried whether they are of God : because many false prophets are gone out into the world.' How can we tell what is true and to be clung to, and what is not in the line of God's purpose and progress? I cannot tell you; we can only examine that which has survived from the past and still appears to exert on mankind an influence, making a man strive to attain what he instinctively feels to be the highest and best. It will hardly be possible in this generation to do more than collect facts. We must sow for others to reap. Yet I think I see dimly enough to make me believe in the reality of this thread about which I have been talking. I cannot tell you exactly what it is except that it recalls a great organ prelude where similar motifs appear and vanish, yet a something runs through the whole, starting one hardly knows when, but rising slowly as a tide. Even so shall the purpose be carried out and the Kingdom come.

Let me add, however, my passionate conviction that the Kingdom of God is no earthly affair as some Christian Socialists would seem to imagine. The individual is of no more moment where the purpose is concerned than a mighty civilization in the past. Populations rise and fall as the world can support them. There is no sacredness in human life. We are too inclined as Christians to bargain with God—we will stand up for you now, if you will give us eternal life hereafter. There may be no such thing as eternal life, what does it matter? Does the private soldier bargain with his captain whom he loves and whom he is prepared to follow blindly without knowing the plan of campaign? When we forget ourselves and stand on God's side not merely hoping for eternal life, but blindly serving God as a devoted dog serves its master, obeying the dictates of the indwelling spirit we feel within us, then shall we have a vision of God and His purpose slowly working itself out as age succeeds to age.

If you have cared to follow up this point and have agreed more or less with what I have been saying, the following beliefs will be found to have been accepted : (1) A belief in a God the maker of heaven and earth; (2) a belief that this God has a purpose in the world; (3) a belief in the relative unimportance of much that appears so important in civilizations; (4) a belief in the comparative unimportance of the individual and what he

wants; (5) a belief that there is a thread of real progress or a true evolution running through all the ups and downs of human history in the past. From all this there results what can be called a deistic standpoint, and this should be for each of us the carefully-laid religious foundation upon which superstructures can be built. For the foundation by itself is hardly enough to help us through daily life. It lacks compelling power and it lacks warmth. Can we not go further?

There is an instinct in humanity to appreciate and struggle to attain to certain ideals. Whether this is a work of God in the individual or another thread of the great purpose comparable to the development of the conception of the one God matters not. This instinct is as much a fact, at any rate among the majority of mankind, as the sense perceptions which we have agreed to accept for our purpose as real facts. Now looking back through history and pre-history, we perceive many teachers who have nurtured this instinct and have risen up to urge their fellow-beings into the 'narrow way.' These men would seem to be especially worthy of our attention, as they have been so closely connected with the development of human character as a whole. But among them there is one whose life story, even when disentangled from all the subsequent myth that grew up around it, is exceptionally interesting in this connection. I refer, of course, to Jesus Christ. Not only did He introduce to humanity a new body of ideals, which were later to fertilize the old Greek religion and furnish us, as a result, with the dogma of organized Christianity in Western Europe, but His own life story, taking into account the circumstances under which He lived, was so striking and ideal as to suggest the belief — whatever you may or may not believe as to the Incarnation and divinity of Christ — that He differed from ourselves at least in degree if not in kind. Personally my favourite parable is that of the vine and the branches: the roots and the branches differ in degree only, but there is all the difference between them. Perhaps we are all graced with a portion of the indwelling spirit of God; if so, to Christ it was given without measure. In so far as that is true, He was indeed the Son of God.

The religion of Christ, that is, His presentation of God to mankind and His rules for life, are in part of universal, in part

particular, application. Those in the first section can apply to-day, but those in the second section are mostly concerned with the particular environment and circumstances of Palestine A.D. 30. Alas, there is no Christian revelation upon many of our problems to-day. We have no idea what Christ would say about the stock exchange or competitive business. Again, in His day there were but few who accepted His teaching. Christianity *was* the religion of the minority and the world was run by pagans; *now* the majority are at least nominal Christians, and yet the world has still to be run in such a manner as not to violate natural laws, such as those studied by the economists and others, over which man has little or no control. However, some of us feel that as Christ Himself was so wonderful, and that as there has been no newer and higher revelation of God since His time, we can in the meanwhile attach our loyalty to Him. We can accept the rôle of branches, with Him as the stem.

Is not this purely anthropomorphic, must not man set up a two-legged god after his own image? Is not the Greek philosopher right when he says that if we were horses our gods would have four legs? Ought we not rather to cling to and try to be loyal to and help forward the great though unknown purpose of God? Perhaps so for some temperaments. But is it the commands given in battle that demand our loyalty? It is surely rather the captain who gives them, as he receives them from high authority above him? So it is surely better, if we can accept Christ as a captain more God-like than ourselves, to give Him our loyalty and range ourselves with Him in helping God slowly to develop His purpose in the world.

Finally, perhaps it may be felt that all this is too intellectual and cold, lacking the warmth engendered by emotional fervour. It has not been my purpose to discuss the rôle that such emotions as love, for example, should play in our religious beliefs. That is not a sphere where the study of our very ancient past will carry us far. Personally I feel that without emotion there is no compelling power—unless you love God you will do nothing. But equally, unless your religion is based on what the brains which nature has given you can accept as true, there is no strength in your beliefs. They are like the corn planted by the

wayside in stony ground : a quick growth without roots which soon withers when the first enthusiasm wanes. I fear I tend to distrust enthusiasm unless kept within strict bounds. It is so easily evoked for so many causes and beliefs, some good and some bad. Enthusiasm has little critical faculty and, like a fire of paper, burns up at once brightly only soon to die down and clog the grate with ashes ! Unless we can supply some intellectual coals, each in our several degree, the fire is apt to go out just when we may be most in need of its steady warmth-giving glow.

So upon the groundwork of Deism with a purpose in the world, let us build a superstructure of loyalty to Christ Jesus as the greatest revealer of God and His purpose which the world has yet seen. And if we would decorate the building, let it be with an enthusiastic love of God. There will thus be reared within us a temple which will indeed be a fit habitation for the indwelling spirit, the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of God Himself.

## BOOK REVIEWS

### THE RECOVERY OF TRUTH\*

It is through re-birth, says Count Hermann Keyserling, that the world continually renews itself. Re-birth, however, does not necessarily mean progress. It may do so, if it is accompanied by the requisite amount of initiative. And, indeed, there can be no doubt that such initiative has been most conspicuous within the last few centuries in the sphere of intellectual activities. Accordingly that section of mankind which has taken an active part in this development may fairly be said to be more capable of *understanding*, in the proper and deep sense of the word, than any earlier class of human beings. Since, however, this greater capacity for understanding depends on a new state of being, the men or women in question are no longer able to realise Eternal Truth in antiquated terms. This accounts for the present-day lack of religious feeling, disbelief in moral law and universal scepticism. Truth needs to be *recovered* in order to become vital truth ; and the recovery of truth involves re-statement, a re-statement which may amount to an absolute improvement on former expressions. The age of blind belief is gone, and the intellect will no longer put up with formulas the truth of which it can call in question on its own premises.

In German the book published in English with the title *The Recovery of Truth* bears the title *Wiedergeburt* (Re-birth), because the real aim of the author is to cultivate the seed rather than to attempt to gather in the harvest. It is written from a personal starting-point, that is to say, from the point of view of one spirit intent on the fecundation of other spirits.

\* *The Recovery of Truth*. By Count Hermann Keyserling. Translated from the German in collaboration with the Author by Paul Fohr. (Jonathan Cape, 1929 Pp. xi, 647. 25/- net.)

The author is convinced that no man can do more for others than stimulate them to independent original thought, and that there are no higher ethics than those he calls the ethics of fruitfulness. He maintains that every progress has been due solely to the influx of the Logos Spermatikos, the creative spirit in its masculine aspect. The book has been written, therefore, with the aim of inducing the evolution of new ideas in the reader's mind rather than with that of furnishing him with a set of ready-made notions.

*The Recovery of Truth* consists largely of lectures delivered at the School of Wisdom founded by Count Keyserling at Darmstadt. It is not incumbent on this School, we are told, to confess any faith. Its only task is to show the way to sense-perception and sense-realisation. It teaches nothing but deeper Understanding. This deeper Understanding is self-perfection in the sense of the centring of consciousness in a higher stratum of being than that of the empiric ego, which thereby becomes a mere means of expression. The founder of the School feels himself to be a man with a mission, and what that mission is has become gradually more and more clear to him. 'My natural disposition permits free experimentation with my own soul, such as not every man may safely do with his. I am organically able to live as a completely open-minded being, without any premises and inhibitions. I have no religious prejudices which would inwardly obstruct personal experiences. Nor have I any racial prejudices, like Marcus Aurelius. Nor am I a sceptic, like Rochecauld; for scepticism means a decision in favour of uncertainty. But, above all, I have been blessed with the power of discarding every yesterday, of arising every morning as a *quasimodo genitus*. The spirit within me is thus enabled with rare ease to create a new body within me. It is for the sake of procuring that opportunity for my spirit that I have been, I believe, given empiric existence. And my historical task consists in realizing the way for a new general status.' This may sound egotistical. To some people such language would be. But Keyserling's mind is so analytical or psycho-analytical that, without conceit, he can appraise and appreciate himself in a unique way. He has clearly been much influenced by psycho-analysis, though he mercilessly exposes its weaknesses and warns us against its dangers.

In his *Travel Diary of a Philosopher*, Keyserling examined exhaustively, amongst other things, the religions of India, China and Japan, and showed an extraordinarily deep insight into the mentality of Orientals. In the present work his insight into other mentalities is none the less remarkable. We are all the more impressed, therefore, when we find that the Jesus of the Gospels stands out for him as the foremost leader of men, and that Christianity, properly understood, is for him the most vital and realizing of all religions. Those who think that Christianity is moribund, because the Churches seem dead, will find no support for their view in the writings of Keyserling. Christianity, he says, surpasses all other world-religions as an accelerating power in the evolutionary process. None ever begins so sure of its goal from the psychologic cardinal point in the matter of possible self-perfection. 'We can assert, without fear of being contradicted by history, that once religion is acknowledged to mean the last word on the possible relations of man towards the Absolute, as we Christians understand the term, Christianity stands above all other religions.' Again, 'Christianity, as most deeply understood, would thus seem destined to maintain its vitality until the end of time, as the symbol of eternal truth, even if nobody were to believe any longer in its actual dogmas.'

If one were to quote all the striking passages in this book, the quotations would fill many pages. Enough has been said here to indicate that Count Keyserling writes in such a way as greatly to arrest our attention and stimulate our thought.

MAURICE A. CANNEY.

### SPIRITUAL CHRISTIANITY.\*

It was Henry Drummond who met the problems of faith raised by new methods of Scriptural interpretation by claiming that 'Religion does not come out of the Bible; the Bible comes out of Religion.' Such is the point of view from which Mr. Bulcock's work has been written; he claims that 'all Scriptures and Faiths have really their foundation in the intuitions and experiences of the human soul.' We tend too much to regard what religion has produced as itself the source of religion.

Does this sound commonplace? Whether it does or not, it contains a whole philosophy of religion, the philosophy which realises that 'as vital religion arose from the soul, so it can be confirmed in the soul,' and, we would add, *in the soul only*. In other words, spiritual things are spiritually discerned. The 'authorities' of Church, and Scripture, and even of the words of Christ, find an echo in that ultimate and intimated authority which lies in the soul. But our spiritual intuitions do not appear to find in *theology* anything upon which they can set their guarantee. Theology seems to speak in a different language about a different subject-matter.

'The New Testament needs interpreters rather than custodians of its theological letter. We cannot do the New Testament theologians justice by a merely traditionalist attitude; we must continue their task in a creative spirit. The basic intuitions remain, and constitute the permanent element in religion, but the intellectual speculations based on them will manifest the restlessness and changes of progressive living thought. New Testament Theology must therefore not be stereotyped, but translated.'

New Testament study from a non-critical standpoint seems practically valueless to anyone who has once become acquainted, to however small an extent, with the methods and results of critical study. But, at the same time, it is possible and even easy for critical study itself to be religiously worthless—or comparatively so—for lack of a *background*. It is such a background that Mr. Bulcock supplies: his critical attitude is radical, but he views his documents as products of something rich in value, significance, depth and *reality*. They were produced by *something*, and the attempt to define *what* that was is the object of this volume, and to show besides that the attempt to isolate and define this *something* was the genesis of all New Testament theology, and even of the New Testament itself.

And the task before us to-day is to discover whether this *something* has any meaning and reality for us. What are we to say to that historic manifestation which we call the life of Christ? Of what was it a manifestation?

'The New Testament homage to Jesus found expression in contemporary categories which showed how men, conscious of the Divine in their own souls, saw God in Jesus. We may find accidental factors in the use of these categories, but the underlying instinct of seeing God in Jesus was not mistaken. The world follows a true instinct in deifying the best

\* *Religion and its New Testament Expression*. By H. Bulcock, M.A., B.D. (Williams & Norgate. 10/6.)

knows. This is the only way of finding in finite life any tangible expression of God. . . . Man cannot see the soul of the universe as a concrete thing apart from the universe; man can only see it *through* the universe, realising it where the universe has shown its highest, noblest and greatest. . . .

The Incarnation thus conceived is independent of 'miracle'; it involves the problem of 'localisation' of God. 'We are not asked to believe that in some thirty years the life and power of the universe was in some way concentrated in a single human body. . . . We think in terms of an organic universe in which the highest in the part approximates to the soul of the whole, and expresses it. . . . What Jesus primarily revealed was divine character, not intellectual truths about God, but God Himself in understandable human terms of love, mercy, courage and sacrifice.'

Mr. Bulcock has written a vigorous and inspiring book, full not only of scholarship and the results of patient thought, but of insight and power. It is clearly and forcibly written, and should be in the hands of all thoughtful people.

J.C.H.

### CREATIVE CHRISTIANITY.\*

This is a rich book. The author neither claims nor appears to be a specialist in any of the manifold aspects of Christianity of which he writes. But he knows how to use specialised knowledge in treating of the inner spirit and values of the great phases through which Christianity has passed, the marks of which it retains. He is, in short, a man of culture. When he says that the great inheritance of hope, which was the best legacy of Hebrew religion, 'passed through the mind of Jesus, and more than through his mind. It passed through his person and his spirit,' Dr. Atkins is revealing what has happened to his own reading and learning. Hence his work has character. Much of its content is an oft-told story, yet he gives it a freshness and a meaning such as no mere collector of information could achieve. His sketch of 'the mind' of Jesus is of the best. He traces the survival of this 'Christian Mind,' its accretions, its modifications, its achievements, its losses, its disappearances, its renewals, in the great moments of Christianity; in the Apostolic Church; in its assumption of the form and the language of 'a deliverance religion'; in its impact upon and transformation of 'the pagan mind'; in its creed-making period; in the development of an ecclesiastical and imperial organisation, until it came 'the religious mind of society.' He goes on to examine the Christian mind in its expression in sacramentalism, in mysticism and in that adventure of liberty which began with the Reformation, but which has largely held up until our own generation—an adventure to which Christianity has really no choice but to keep.

In all this Dr. Atkins recognises and emphasizes, sometimes perhaps exaggerates, what is good, though it is but seldom that the reader feels he is consciously trying to do so. At the same time, the story abundantly illustrates his own words:

'There is always the tragic danger that the spirit which created for itself such a wealth of forms should escape the forms it had created and the forms be left untenanted by living realities. . . . And you have the Pharisaism of Jesus' time or any time since. Pharisaism is religion sitting by a cold hearthstone and protecting the ashes from the fire.'

\* *The Making of the Christian Mind*. By Gaius Glenn Atkins, D.D., Professor of Rhetorics in Auburn Theological Seminary. (Heinemann, 1929. Price 8/6.)

He is also aware that

‘Christianity has inherited an excess baggage train of doctrinal survivals, which hampers it sadly in its present campaign.’

Christians forget that the teaching of Jesus has endless power of adaptation, because it is less a programme than a spirit which has an unrelenting work to do.

It is the Christian humanitarianism so characteristic of our own day to which the author looks to lead to the rediscovery of the mind of Christ. He understands this movement and is not deluded by it.

‘It is in some ways the substitution of practical programmes for doctrine and even devotion; it is an escape from doubt and spiritual bewilderment. A St. Paul, in his more critical moments, might call it a substitute of good works for a mystic life hid with Christ in God. Plenty of people who are by no means St. Pauls call it a busy meddling of the Church with what is none of the Church’s business, at the cost of true religion.’

Yet it is really a rediscovery of the mind of Christ, and will do more than justify the humanitarian passion of Christianity: it will furnish the road back to God and to spiritual reality.

The book is written in a distinctive and attractive style. It occasionally degenerates, as when in writing of the English Reformation the author says the altars were stripped bare, ‘but the old spires pointed to the old stars.’ His colour-adjectives are also a little trying — ‘gray Canterbury and ivory-coloured Lincoln.’ Occasionally the artistry of the language is more apparent than the substance of the thought, and there are a few printing errors. But the work is well done; it is illuminating and stimulating. Many clergymen find themselves in the position of having to say something rather than having something to say: they will indeed be dull if, with a little concentration and care, they cannot find within these pages both refreshment and light.

J.S.B.

### THE MASTER: A LIFE OF JESUS CHRIST.\*

The rediscovery, through biblical criticism, of the Jesus of History has produced in recent years a great number of reconstructions of the life of Jesus. To every student, as to the authors of the different Gospels, the figure of Jesus stands in some slightly different light, and it is not too much to say that every new life is for this reason worth reading, and presents something new and suggestive. The latest that has come into our hands, by W. R. Bowie, author of *The Inescapable Christ*, is more noteworthy for its general reasonableness and balance than for any outstanding emphasis on any one feature of the New Testament portrait. It is a useful book for anyone who requires the moderate results of modern criticism in the form of a continuous life of Our Lord. The author discounts ‘the apparent reverence, which does not, in fact, fulfil the ends of God,’ because it will not face the fact that it was in a fully human personality that the character of God was revealed. His attitude to miracles is a proper sense of their irrelevance for Christ himself and for the Christian religion. “Mighty works” and other phrases similar to it have often been misread, with results disastrous to the understanding of Jesus. “Mighty works” have been taken to mean prodigies. Jesus has been pictured, in what has believed itself to be the orthodox imagination.

\* *The Master: A Life of Jesus Christ*. By Walter Russell Bowie. pp. 371. (John Murray. 7/6.)

ion, as doing such astounding deeds of power that the dullest observer might conclude that here must be God come down to earth. But to suppose this is not only to obscure his humanness: it is also to misinterpret God. The "mighty works" which Jesus did, and which he spoke of, were no prodigies. Whenever they were mighty—and in unbelieving Nazareth they could not be—he thought of them as that mighty naturalness with which the Spirit of God must operate through lives which were open to receive it. . . . The God he loved and whom he wanted men to understand was the God who could never be seen in outward signs, nor ever received till men received his meaning in their souls.' Not very much attention is given to the eschatological outlook of Jesus. The Kingdom is taken chiefly as present and spiritual. 'To Jesus the Kingdom was not only future. It was future in the sense that only God could fully establish it. But in another sense it was also present. The Kingdom was already in the midst of men, and He Himself, in His tremendous personal consciousness that His Father was working through Him, was the centre of it.' In giving descriptions and interpretations of incidents and sayings of Jesus, the author sometimes seems to fail a little through a lack of artistic parsimony. Still, perhaps the best chapter in the book is the one where he gives his interpretation of the Religion which Jesus lived and taught. Typical of the best of his description is his account of the meaning of faith. 'Who should establish that Kingdom? God. In that one word the tremendous faith of Jesus focussed. His belief in God was no tepid hypothesis, which is all that some men conceive when they think of religion; it was a radiant and overwhelming confidence. He believed that what men could not do, God could do, and would, if He could find souls obedient to His purpose. He believed that the spiritual energies of God are transcendent facts, mightily existent, superbly available to accomplish in human life what that life in its uninspired dullness would not dare to dream.'

G.F.A.

#### ZOROASTRIANISM.\*

Dr. A. Mingana in an Introduction to the late Principal J. T. Marshall's *Manual of the Aramaic Language* speaks of Aramaic as 'a beautiful language which deserves to be more widely studied.' To say that it deserves to be more widely studied is a mild way of expressing the matter. To express it more strongly, it is simply amazing that the study of Aramaic, which is so important for the understanding alike of the Old and New Testament should be neglected as it is in this country by Biblical students. The late Canon Knowling, of Durham, felt this, and quite late in life exerted himself to learn Christian Aramaic or Syriac. If more students of the Bible could be induced to learn Syriac, people would soon begin to realise its importance. More than that, students would find that the reading of the New Testament in a Semitic language, resembling closely what was probably the language of some, at least, of the original documents, brings light and life to many passages. What has this to do with Zoroastrianism? It has this to do with it, that a knowledge of Aramaic is important also for the study of some of the sacred texts of the Zoroastrians, since Aramaic had a considerable influence on Pahlavi. The late Professor E. G. Browne, of Cambridge, went so far as to say that for the study of Pahlavi a good knowledge of Aramaic is essential.

\* *The Zoroastrian Doctrine of a Future Life*. By Jal Dastur Cursetji Pavry, A.M., Ph.D. Second Edition. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929.)

The second edition of Dr. Pavry's learned book on a persistently held Zoroastrian doctrine directs one's thoughts to literary sources, because these are taken account of so thoroughly and fully. It is not an easy book to read, because it is so scientific. But to read it is not only to study under a competent guide the presentations of the Zoroastrian doctrine of a future life from the time of death to that of the individual judgment, but also to gain an insight into the literature, the Gathās, the Later Avesta, the Pahlavi and the Parsi-Persian writings. Since the writer's object is primarily to present the Zoroastrian doctrine of a future life, he has had to refrain from dealing in this volume with the very interesting and important problem of the relationship between Zoroastrianism, Judaism and Christianity, and of their possible interdependence. The treatment of this problem, we gather, is reserved for a future volume. It will be awaited with great curiosity. In the meantime, we are thankful for what we have received already, a volume which ought to find a place in every well-equipped library.

M.A.C.

### THE CHILD IN THE CHURCH.\*

Father Roche, in his Preface to this book, says that 'it should be read by everyone of whatever creed who believes in the personal and interior religion of the young,' and he quotes the maxim of Mgr. Dupanloup, '*Je respecterai la liberté humaine dans le moindre enfant.*' Madame Montessori's methods have won such recognition in every other sphere that it is very interesting to read of their application to that of religious instruction. The book, with its illustrations, is both fascinating and delightful, besides being inspiring to every teacher. It is highly interesting to learn that the method should have received 'express Papal Benediction'; it seems to indicate that the Roman Church, in whatever respects it may be reactionary, at least is not so in education. Every teacher of young children should get hold of this book.

### FROM MOSES TO HOSEA.\*

Many teachers and others will be grateful to Mrs. Wells for her readable and interesting account of Hebrew prophecy from Moses to Hosea. The book will be of the utmost value to teachers and others. Not only does it give an adequate account of historic events as they may be presumed to have occurred, but it is particularly helpful in indicating the developments of religious and moral ideas which took place, and also in showing what was at stake in the Contest between the early prophetic figures and their adversaries. This book is to be heartily recommended.

### THE BIBLE MADE INTERESTING.\*

This 'little library of exposition' has been admirably planned. The method followed is to give a short and readable introduction to the particular book of the Bible dealt with, and then to present passages from the book itself, accompanied by well-chosen quotations from eminent authors, ancient and modern. Opening a page at random, we have Matthew vi, 19-21. The title at the head of the page is 'The Peril of Earthly-mindedness,' and we have quotations from Luther, Trench, Augustine and

\* *The Child in the Church.* By Maria Montessori. (Sands & Co. 5/-.)

\* *Pioneer Prophets.* By Ursula Wells. (S.P.C.K. 3/6.)

\* Messrs. Cassell & Co.'s Study Bible Series: (1) *Proverbs to the Song of Songs* and (2) *St. Matthew.* (3/6 each.)

Chrysostom. The introductions, all by competent scholars, are invariably well done. Preachers and teachers, as well as ordinary readers, should find these books very helpful.

### HYMNS WITHOUT TUNES.\*

In his introduction to his earlier book of poems, *The Way*, Mr. Bradby wrote, 'In these days of disillusionment many are turning again to the Gospel story, determined to find out for themselves, if they possibly can, what Jesus really meant, and whether the failure of civilisation to achieve happiness may not, after all, spring from a failure to understand His message. Where men and women are engaged on such a quest, even the halting efforts of a kindred mind to find the answer sometimes possess a certain interest—an interest which depends, not on the personality of the writer, nor on any felicity of expression, but simply on the fact that to see one's own guesses at truth reflected in the thought of another does, somehow, encourage one to persevere.' Those who have read these poems must have found, not only the reflection of their own guesses, but often the further encouragement, from one whose imagination has penetrated at some point a little further than they have yet done into the beauty of the religion of Christ. Those who have thus read and valued the first volume will be glad to know of the recent publication of some more poems by Mr. Bradby. The themes here are the seasons of the Christian year and an occasional saying, not as before, incidents, in the life of our Lord. That these new poems offer again the encouragement of a true Christian imagination, two examples may show. For Midnight, there is a hymn:—

If any wake,  
Direct their thoughts aright;  
If any weep,  
Make thou their burden light;  
Thou dost not sleep,  
And, where Thou art, the darkness is not night.

A hymn for Lent begins:—

The Pharisee, the righteous man,  
Thanked God, with reverent grateful pride,  
He was not as the Publican;  
And went away unjustified.  
Lord, grant us understanding hearts, lest we  
Thank God we are not as the Pharisee.

G.F.A.

### MODERNIST POETRY.\*

Could we afford it, we would send a copy of Mr. D. H. Lawrence's poems to every bishop on the bench, so important do we regard it that our ecclesiastical superiors should comprehend the mentality of post-war youth. Not that Mr. Lawrence is any longer (we take it) in his twenties; but he is read with devout zeal by those who are.

He is of the apostolic succession of Whitman and of Nietzsche, both of whom were forcible prophets, and set going streams which have not yet run dry. Not that our poet desires to preach to us, or nag at us, or dogmatise in any way: what he offers are 'casual thoughts that are true

\* *Hymns without Tunes*. By G. F. Bradby. pp. 32. (George Over, Ltd., Rugby. 1/6.)

\* *Pansies*. By D. H. Lawrence. (Martin Secker. 10/6.)

while they are true and irrelevant when the mood and circumstance changes.'

Post-war scepticism finds expression in these pages, combined with a truculent readiness to smash up shams and to clear away rubbish—

'O destiny

If I could see your hand, and it were thumbs down,

I would be willing to give way, like the pterodactyl, and accept obliteration.

But if it is thumbs up, and mankind must go on being mankind,  
Then I am willing to fight, I will roll my sleeves up  
And start in.'

That is the stuff. Take another example :

'While you listen in, while you watch the film, while you drive the car,

While you read about the air-ship crossing the wild Atlantic  
Behold, you are living the great life, the stupendous life !

As you know, it is a complete lie,

You are all going dead and corpse-pale listening in to the lie.  
Spit it out.'

This is good advice. Here is some more :

'It's either you fight or you die,  
Young gents, you've got no option.

No good asking the reason why :

It's either you fight or you die,

Die, die, lily-liveredly die,

Or fight and make the splinters fly.

Bust up the holy apple-pie.

You've got no option,

Don't say you can't, start in and try :

Give great hypocrisy the lie,

And tackle the blowsy big blow-fly

Of money ; do it or die !

You've got no option.'

Mr. Lawrence certainly has a money complex ; listen to this :

'Kill money, put money out of existence.

It is a perverted instinct, a hidden thought

Which rots the brain, the blood, the bones, the stones, the soul.'

Again : 'The mosquito knows full well, small as he is  
he's a beast of prey.

But after all

he only takes his bellyfull,

he doesn't put my blood in the bank.'

We have ventured to quote these poems at some length, because they seem to us to indicate that certain changes of outlook are developing which will have their repercussions upon religion and values generally. And whether we like it or no we cannot stop it.

'The one thing the old will never understand

is that you can't prevent change.

All flows, and even the old are rapidly flowing away,

And the young are flowing in the throes of a great alteration.'

J.C.H.